One Example of Healthcare Misinformation

On June 21^st  NBC News aired an investigation into HCA Healthcare accusing HCA administration of pressuring doctors, nurses and family to have patients enter hospice care or be discharged (1). Patients entering hospice care can lower inpatient mortality rate and length of stay, increasing profits and bonuses for executives. It works this way — if a patient passes away in a hospital, that death adds to the facility’s inpatient mortality figures. But if that person dies after a transfer to hospice care — even if the patient stays at the same hospital in the same bed — the death doesn’t count toward the facility’s inpatient mortality rate because the patient was technically discharged from the hospital. A reduction in lengthy patient stays is a secondary benefit according to an internal HCA hospital document (1). Under end-of-life care, patients don’t typically live long, so the practice can allow HCA to replace patients that may be costing the facility money because their insurance has run out with those who generate fresh revenues.

These practices are not unique to HCA nor are they new. Manipulation of patient data such as mortality go back at least until the 1990’s. For example, at the Phoenix VA the floor inpatient mortality rate was low while the ICU mortality rate was high. This was apparently due to excess mortality in floor to ICU transfers (2). Reduction of inappropriate ICU transfers from the hospital floor corrected the high ICU mortality rate. Similar changes were seen for length of stay. There were also dramatic reductions in the incidence of ICU ventilator-associated pneumonias and central line-associated blood stream infections just by alternating the reported cause of pneumonia or sepsis. For example, ventilator-associated pneumonia was called “delayed onset community acquired pneumonia” and sepsis was blamed on a source other than the presence of a central line.

These data manipulations were not restricted to the inpatient mortality or length of stay. Outrageously exaggerated claims of improvement and lives saved became almost the norm. In 2003 Jonathan B. Perlin, then VA Undersecretary of Health, realized that outcome data was needed for interventions such as pneumococcal vaccination with the 23-polyvalent pneumococcal vaccine. On August 11, 2003 at the First Annual VA Preventive Medicine Training Conference in Albuquerque, NM, Perlin claimed that the increase in pneumococcal vaccination saved 3914 lives between 1996 and 1998 (3) (For a copy of the slides used by Perlin click here). Furthermore, Perlin claimed pneumococcal vaccination resulted in 8000 fewer admissions and 9500 fewer days of bed care between 1999 and 2001. However, these data were not measured but based on extrapolation from a single, non-randomized, observational study (4). Most studies have suggested that the 23-polyvalent vaccine is of little or no value in adults (5).

It raises the question of why bother to manipulate these data? The common denominator is money. Administrators demand that the numbers meet the requirements to receive their bonuses (1). At the VA the focus changed from meeting the needs of the patient to meeting the performance measures. HCA administration is accused of similar manipulations. Speculation is that many if not most healthcare administrators behave similarly. The rationale is that the performance measures represent good care which is not necessarily true (5).

Who can prevent this pressuring of care givers and patient families to make the numbers look better? One would expect that regulatory organizations such as the Joint Commission, Institute of Medicine, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Veterans Affairs would require the data reported be accurate. However, to date they have shown little interest in questioning data which makes their administration look good. The Joint Commission is a National Regulatory group that is prominent in healthcare regulation. After leaving the VA in 2006, Perlin was named the President, Clinical Operations and Chief Medical Officer of Nashville, Tennessee-based HCA Healthcare prior to being named the President and subsequently CEO of the Joint Commission in 2022. When regulatory organizations get caught burying their heads in the sand, administrators usually respond by blaming the malfeasance on a few bad apples. An example is the VA wait scandal that led to the ouster of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Eric Shinseki, and the termination of multiple administrators at the Phoenix VA. It should be noted that although Phoenix was the focus of the VA Inspector General at least 70% of medical centers were misreporting the wait times similarly to Phoenix (6).

Who should be the watchdogs and whistleblowers on these and other questionable practices – obviously, the hospital doctors and nurses. However, the hospitals have these employees so under their thumb that any complaint is often met with the harshest and most severe sanctions. Doctors or nurses who complain are often labeled “disruptive” or are accused of being substandard. The latter can be accomplished by a sham review of patient care and reporting to the physician or nurse to a regulatory authority such as the National Practitioner’s Databank or state boards of medicine or nursing (7). Financial data may be even easier to manipulate (8). A recent example comes from Kern County Hospital in Bakersville, CA (9). There the hospital’s employee union accuses the hospital of $23 million in overpayment to the hospital executives over 4 years. According to the union the hospital tried to cover up the overpayment. Now the executives have requested the hospital board to cover the overpayments.

The point is that hospital data can be manipulated. One should always look at self-reported data with healthy skepticism, especially if administrative bonuses are dependent on the data. Some regulatory authority needs to examine and certify that the reported data is correct. It seems unlikely that Dr. Perlin’s Joint Commission will carefully examine and report accurate hospital data. Hopefully, another regulator will accept the charge of ensuring that hospital data is accurate and reliable.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor, SWJPCCS

References

1. NBC News. HCA Hospitals Urge Staff to Move Patients to Hospice to Improve Mortality Stats Doctors and Nurses Say. June 21, 2023. Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/hca-hospitals-urge-staff-to-move-patients-to-hospice-to-improve-mortality-stats-doctors-and-nurses-say-183585349871 (accessed 6/28/23).
2. Robbins RA. Unpublished observations.
3. Perlin JB. Prevention in the 21^st Century: Using Advanced Technology and Care Models to Move from the Hospital and Clinic to the Community and Caring. Building the Prevention Workforce: August 11, 2003. First Annual VA Preventive Medicine Training Conference. Albuquerque, NM.   
4. Nichol KL, Baken L, Wuorenma J, Nelson A. The health and economic benefits associated with pneumococcal vaccination of elderly persons with chronic lung disease. Arch Intern Med. 1999;159(20):2437-42. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
5. Robbins RA. The unfulfilled promise of the quality movement. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(1):50-63. [CrossRef]
6. Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General. Concerns with Consistency and Transparency in the Calculation and Disclosure of Patient Wait Time Data. April 7, 2022. Available at: https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-21-02761-125.pdf (accessed 6/28/23).
7. Chalifoux R Jr. So, what is a sham peer review? MedGenMed. 2005 Nov 15;7(4):47; discussion 48. [PubMed].
8. Beattie A. Common Clues of Financial Statement Manipulation. Investopedia. April 29, 2022. Available at: https://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/statementmanipulation.asp (accessed 7/28/23).
9. Kayser A. California Hospital Accused of Overpaying for Executive Services. Becker’s Hospital Review. June 28, 2023. Available at: https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/compensation-issues/california-hospital-accused-of-overpaying-for-executive-services.html?origin=BHRE&utm_source=BHRE&utm_medium=email&utm_content=newsletter&oly_enc_id=6133H6750001J5K  (accessed 6/29/23).

Cite as: Robbins RA. One Example of Healthcare Misinformation. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care Sleep. 2023;27(1):8-10. doi: https://doi.org/10.13175/swjpccs029-23 PDF

VA Administrators Breathe a Sigh of Relief

On May 30, Eric Shinseki, the Secretary for Veterans Affairs (VA), resigned under pressure amidst a growing scandal regarding falsification of patient wait times at nearly 40 VA medical centers. Before leaving office Shinseki fired Sharon Helman, the former hospital director at the Phoenix VA, where the story first broke, along with her deputy and another unnamed administrator. In addition, Susan Bowers, director of VA Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) 18 and Helman’s boss, resigned. Robert Petzel, undersecretary for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA, head of the VA hospitals and clinics), had resigned earlier. You could hear the sigh of relief from the VA administrators.

With their bosses resigning left and right, the VA leadership in shambles and the reputation of the VA  soiled for many years to come, why are the VA administrators relieved? The simple answer is that nothing has really changed. There for a moment it looked like real reform might happen. Even President Obama in announcing Shinseki's resignation said the "There is a need for a change in culture..." (1). Shinseki’s resignation would indicate that any action to change the culture is unlikely. Sure a few administrators, like Helman, will lose their jobs, perhaps a few patients will get outsourced to private practioners, but nothing is being done or proposed to change the VA culture. A new interim VA secretary was named and his tenure is likely to be lengthy since no confirmation appears to go unchallenged in the US Congress, and who would want the job?

I was at the VA, when then undersecretary for VHA, Kenneth Kizer, made the fundamental change that resulted in the present mess. Kizer had come to the VA with a program he called the “prescription for change” (2). Indeed, Kizer made several changes but the one that really counted was that the chiefs of staff, doctors who ran the medical services in VA hospitals, were replaced by the head of the Medical Administration Service, usually a business person. This made the VA director the monarch over their own little kingdom, and we all know “it’s good to be the king”. Furthermore, we all know that power corrupts and now with absolute power, the VA director was absolutely corrupted. The hospital directors eliminated any sources of potential opposition. Physicians who did not “play ball” could suddenly find themselves as a target of an investigation (3). After being found guilty by a kangaroo court, their names would be turned over to the National Practioner Databank as bad doctors making it difficult to find a job outside the VA. Those cooperative physicians were rewarded, often for limiting the care of patients. In other words, putting the VA administrators’ interests before the patients’ (4). Lastly, the long-standing relationship with the Nation’s medical schools was destroyed (remember VA dean’s hospitals?). It was argued that the medical schools used the VA to serve their needs. Although this had some truth, it is part of the two-way street that makes cooperation possible. No VA administrator wanted a bunch of doctors and academics telling them what to do.

After eliminating any possible oversight from the physicians or the medical schools, an insulating administrative layer had to be placed between the hospitals and VA central office. Therefore, the Veterans Integrated Service Networks or VISNs, were created. Although ostensibly to improve oversight and efficiency (2), only in Washington would they believe that another layer of bureaucracy would do either. As more and more patients were packed into the system, the numbers of physicians and nurses decreased (5). Not surprisingly, wait times became longer and there was no alternative but to hide the truth. The administrators, the VISNs and VA Central office were all complicit in these lies. Their bonuses depended on it and even when it was discovered by the VA Office of Inspector General (VAOIG) nothing was done.

Congress, who supposedly also provides oversight, was swift to propose action that does not change the VA culture and accomplish little. In this election year Congressional cries to throw those VA bums out have been consistent and loud. However, plenty of clues were available to know that the wait time data was false. First, the concept that you can cut the numbers of physicians and nurses and improve wait times defies common sense. Second, the VAOIG had repeatedly reported that wait times were being falsified. Helman had already been accused of this when she was the director at the Spokane VA (6). This week the Senate passed a bill allowing veterans to see private doctors outside the VA system if they experience long wait times or live more than 40 miles from a VA facility; make it easier to fire VA officials; construct 26 new VA medical facilities and use $500 million in unobligated VA funds to hire additional VA doctors and nurses (7). The VA already is able to do the first two, and as the present crisis illustrates, funds can be diverted away from healthcare. It seems likely this is exactly what will happen unless additional oversight is provided.

Kizer and Ashish Jha authored an editorial on this crisis in the New England Journal of Medicine this week (8). They made three recommendations:

1. The VA should refocus on fewer measures that directly address what is most important to veteran patients and clinicians-especially outcome measures.
2. Some of the resources supporting the central and network office bureaucracies could be redirected to bolster the number of caregivers.
3. The VA needs to engage more with health care organizations and the general public.

All these recommendations are reasonable. Outcome measures, not process of care, should be measured (9). Paying bonuses to administrators for clinicians completing these process of care measures should stop. Many of these measures serve mostly to increase administrative bonuses and not improve patient care. By giving administrators supervisory authority over physicians, healthcare providers were forced to complete a seemingly endless checklists rather than serve the patients' interests.

Bureaucracies should be reduced. VA's central-office staff has grown from about 800 in the late 1990s to nearly 11,000 in 2012 (8). VISN offices have reflected this growth with over 4500 employees in 2012 (10). This diversion of funds away from healthcare is the source of the present problem.

The VA needs to re-engage with the medical schools and with its patients. Reestablishment of the Dean's Committee or other similar system that provides oversight of the VA hospital directors and administrators may be one method of achieving this oversight. The association of the medical schools with the VA served the VA well from the Second World War until the 1990s (11).

Poor pay and micromanagement of physicians to perform meaningless metrics makes primary care onerous. Appropriating funds might improve the salary discrepancy between the VA and the private sector but will not fix the micromanagement problem. The VA may find it difficult to recruit the needed physicians and nurses unless a more friendly work environment is created. How do we know that any appropriated money will be spent on healthcare providers and infrastructure unless additional oversight is put in place? Without oversight the VA positions will become VA vacancies and the VA hospitals will become administrative palaces. Local oversight by VA physicians, nurses and patients is one method of ensuring that appropriated monies are actually spent on healthcare.

VA health care is at a crossroads. New leadership can help the VA succeed but only if the administrative structure is fixed changing the VA culture. Until this occurs the same administrative monarchs will continue to rule their realms and nothing will really change.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care

References

1. Cohen T, Griffin D, Bronstein S, Black N. Shinseki resigns, but will that improve things at VA hospitals? CNN. May 31, 2014. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/30/politics/va-hospitals-shinseki/ (accessed 6/7/14).
2. Kizer KW. Prescription for change. March 1996. Available at: http://www.va.gov/HEALTHPOLICYPLANNING/rxweb.pdf (accessed 6/7/14). 
3. Wagner D. The doctor who launched the VA scandal. Arizona Republic. May 31, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/longform/news/arizona/investigations/2014/05/31/va-scandal-whistleblower-sam-foote/9830057/ (accessed 6/7/14).
4. Hsieh P. Three factors that corrupted VA health care and threaten the rest of American medicine. Forbes. May 30, 2014. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulhsieh/2014/05/30/three-factors-that-corrupted-va-health-care/ (accessed 6/7/14).
5. Robbins RA. VA administrators gaming the system. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;4:149-54. Available at: http://www.swjpcc.com/editorial/2012/5/5/va-administrators-gaming-the-system.html (accessed 6/7/14).
6. Robbins RA. VA scandal widens. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(5):288-9. Available at: http://www.swjpcc.com/editorial/2014/5/26/va-scandal-widens.html (accessed 6/7/14). 
7. O'Keefe E. Senators reach bipartisan deal on bill to fix VA. Washington Post. June 5, 2014. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/06/05/senators-reach-bipartisan-deal-on-bill-to-fix-va/ (accessed 6/7/14).
8. Kizer KW, Jha AK. Restoring trust in VA health care. N Engl J Med. 2014 Jun 4. [Epub ahead of print]. Available at: http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1406852 (accessed 6/7/14). [CrossRef]
9. Robbins RA, Klotz SA. Quality of care in U.S. hospitals. N Engl J Med. 2005;353(17):1860-1. [CrossRef]
10. VA Office of Inspector General. Audit of management control structures for veterans integrated service network offices. March 27, 2012. Available at: http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-10-02888-129.pdf (accessed 6/7/14).
11. VA policy memorandum no. 2: policy in association of veterans' hospitals with medical schools. January 30, 1946. Available at: http://www.va.gov/oaa/Archive/PolicyMemo2.pdf (accessed 6/7/14).

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Refence as: Robbins RA. VA administrators breathe a sigh of relief. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(6):336-9. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc077-14 PDF