A Failure of Oversight at the VA

On September 8, 2014 the Washington Examiner reported that the Central Office of the VA was allowed to change language in the VA Office of Inspector General (VAOIG) report on delays in patient care at the Phoenix VA Medical Center (1). Crucial language that the VAOIG could not “conclusively” prove that delays in care caused patient deaths at a Phoenix hospital was added to its final report after a draft version was sent to agency administrators for comment. Rep. Jeff Miller, chairman of the House veterans' committee, said "there are significant differences between the final IG report and the draft version ...". The following day Richard Griffin, the acting VAOIG, vigorously defended the independence of his office and bristled at the allegations that the VA was allowed to alter his office's report. However, his denials and indignance seem disingenuous.

To understand why, we need to go back a few years. First, the Phoenix VA overspent its Fee Basis consult budget in 2010. This is the money budgeted to send patients outside the VA for care. To do this a request was filled out and reviewed. Although the Chief of Staff often reviews these requests, this responsibility was delegated to the associate chief of staff for ambulatory care, Keith Piatt. He nearly always approved these requests. Dr. Piatt had other duties including patient care and limited expertise in several of the areas he was requested to evaluate. Furthermore, poor accounting made if unclear if there was sufficient money to pay for these consults. However, rather than questioning why so many patients were outsourced, the VAOIG blamed the problem on the inadequacy of Dr. Piatt's reviews (2). Given this recent IG investigation, it is not surprising that the Phoenix VA administrators were reluctant to outsource patients.

Second, Sam Foote, the initial whistleblower at the Phoenix VA contacted VAOIG in October, 2013. However, according to Foote the VAOIG did not seem to take his allegations seriously, and did what appears to be a superficial investigation (1). So Foote went to the House Committee on Veterans Affairs this past February. Only after the scandal was made public did the VAOIG acknowledge the inadequate care at the Phoenix VA.

Third, the VA prematurely made press releases prior to the release of the VAOIG's final report attempting to exonerate their responsibility (1,3). The final VAOIG report, apparently altered by the VA, was "unable to conclusively assert that the absence of timely quality care caused the deaths of these veterans.” Although this would hardly seem to be an exoneration, media outlets widely reported that whistle-blower allegations were exaggerated and that veterans were not severely affected by wrongdoing at the Phoenix VA medical center. However, in several instances it would seem likely that delayed care contributed to premature patient deaths and would was questioned in a Senate hearing on September 10, 2014 (3).

Fourth, VAOIG investigators corroborated virtually every major allegation of wrongdoing submitted by the first whistle-blower, Dr. Sam Foote (3). Nevertheless, the report and congressional briefing papers contain passages that appear to criticize Foote and his credibility, emphasizing that "the whistle-blower did not provide us with a list of 40 patient names" referring to VA patients Foote said died while awaiting care in Phoenix. This passage was apparently added by VA Central Office. Foote said the portion of the report about him is "false and misleading" because he and other whistle-blowers provided 24 names to inspectors and explained where to identify16 more. The VA report acknowledged that Foote had supplied at least 17 names and that others could not be traced because documentation had been destroyed by VA employees. Rather than defending their indefensible actions, VA Central Office has apparently resorted to denial, indignance, and blaming the whistleblower.

Fifth, the VA continues to obfuscate and obstruct investigations. According to the VAOIG, managers at 13 VA facilities lied to investigators about scheduling problems and other issues and officials at 42 of the 93 sites engaged in manipulation of scheduling, including 19 sites where appointments were cancelled and then rescheduled for the same day to meet on-time performance goals (4). However, it remains unclear whether officials at the Phoenix and Cheyenne VAs have been fired or even suspended. Citing privacy issues, the VA has refused to comment. However, in 2011, Jack Bagdade, a Phoenix VA physician, was fired for violation of the Hatch Act (5). His firing was widely publicized locally. Bagdade was lobbying Senator John McCain for a new research building at the Phoenix VA. Bagdade forwarded an e-mail from McCain's office entitled "Drink Beer for John McCain". If Bagdade's termination for forwarding an e-mail was appropriate punishment (and I am certainly not saying that it was), then what is appropriate punishment for VA administrators who knowingly manipulated patient appointments for their own personal gain, altered records and then lied to investigators?

Several of the VA administrators involved are also licensed physicians and nurses. However, both the Arizona Board of Medical Examiners and Arizona Board of Nursing have been strangely silent. Altering medical records and then lying about it would seem to be a clear violation of the Arizona statues.

Congress also has to accept some responsibility for their lack of oversight. The problem of inadequate numbers of physicians has been known for years (6). Recently appointed VA Secretary, Robert McDonald, pointed out that the Phoenix VA has now hired 53 additional full-time employees in recent months to help alleviate the appointment backlog (4). He did not mention how many of these employees are physicians nor did he mention how many of the patients were outsourced. However, it seems likely that the hires were merely new administrative personnel to outsource the care of patients. One senior VA official who asked not to be identified said that morale at the VA is poor and doubted that the VA will be able to fill the multiple physician vacancies commenting "Who would want to work here?".

Congress passing a bill to make it easier to fire senior VA administrators suggests they realize there is a problem. However, the legislation still leaves the control of the money up to the very people who misspent it bringing about the present crises. It is also unclear who will do the firing. To date no administrators have been fired despite the law supposedly making this easier. It seems unlikely that any VA administrators are going to fire their colleagues for doing what they are probably also doing or know about. "One of the chief lessons of the VA scandal is that we cannot rely on VA, alone, to effectively identify and correct problems plaguing the department," said Rep. Jeff Miller, chairman of the house veterans' committee. "Oversight and feedback from outside stakeholders is crucial to ensuring VA delivers the benefits and services our veterans have earned." (7). I agree. However, it is doubtful based on their lack of action that either the VAOIG or VA Central Office will take any substantive action to hold those accountable for this scandal and its cover-up.  A reasonable solution is to establish a system for local oversight by physicians, nurses and patients (8). Rep. Miller is right, we cannot rely on the VA to fix this problem and oversight is crucial.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Editor

References

1. Taupin M. IG let veterans affairs officials alter report to absolve agency in phoenix deaths. Washington Examiner. September 8, 2014. Available at: http://washingtonexaminer.com/ig-let-veterans-affairs-officials-alter-report-to-absolve-agency-in-deaths/article/2553035 (accessed 9/10/14).
2. VA Office of Inspector General. Review of Alleged Mismanagement of Non-VA Fee Care Funds at the Phoenix VA Health Care System. November 8, 2011. Available at: http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-11-02280-23.pdf (accessed 9/10/14).
3. Wagner D. Critics: VA influenced Inspector General to change Phoenix report for spin-control. Arizona Republic. September 10, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/investigations/2014/09/10/report-phoenix-va-deaths-raises-questions/15375005/ (accessed 9/10/14).
4. Daly M. Watchdog: VA managers lied to investigators about delays. Associated Press. September 9, 2014. Available at: http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/nation/politics/2014/09/09/watchdog-va-managers-lied-delays/15334159/ (accessed 9/10/14).
5. Kujz S. Valley doctor loses job over invitation to have beer with Arizona senator. ABC News. March 25, 2011. Available at: http://www.abc15.com/news/region-phoenix-metro/central-phoenix/valley-doctor-loses-job-over-invitation-to-have-beer-with-arizona-senator (accessed 9/10/14).
6. Robbins RA. VA administrators gaming the system. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;4:149-54. Available at: http://www.swjpcc.com/editorial/2012/5/5/va-administrators-gaming-the-system.html (accessed 9/10/14).
7. Jordan B. Congressman takes va oversight on the road. Military.com news. August 12, 2014. Available at: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/08/12/congressman-takes-va-oversight-on-the-road.html (accessed 9/10/14).
8. Robbins RA. VA administrators breathe a sigh of relief. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(6):336-9. [CrossRef] 

*The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado or California Thoracic Societies or the Mayo Clinic.

Reference as: Robbins RA. A failure of oversight at the VA. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;9(3):179-82. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc119-14 PDF

VA Administrators Gaming the System

On 4-23-12 the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report of the accuracy of the Veterans Healthcare Administration (VHA) wait times for mental health services. The report found that “VHA does not have a reliable and accurate method of determining whether they are providing patients timely access to mental health care services. VHA did not provide first-time patients with timely mental health evaluations and existing patients often waited more than 14 days past their desired date of care for their treatment appointment. As a result, performance measures used to report patient’s access to mental health care do not depict the true picture of a patient’s waiting time to see a mental health provider.” (1). The OIG made several recommendations and the VA administration quickly concurred with these recommendations. Only four days earlier the VA announced plans to hire 1900 new mental health staff (2).

This sounded familiar and so a quick search on the internet revealed that about a year ago the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a scathing ruling saying that the VA had failed to provide adequate mental health services to Veterans (3). A quick review of the Office of Inspector General’s website revealed multiple instances of similar findings dating back to at least 2002 (4-7). In each instance, unreliable data regarding wait times was cited, VA administration agreed, and no or inadequate action was taken.

Inadequate Numbers of Providers

One of the problems is that inadequate numbers of clinical physicians and nurses are employed by the VA to care for the patients. In his “Prescription for Change”, Dr. Ken Kizer, then VA Undersecretary for Health, made bold changes to the VA system in the mid 1990’s (8). Kizer cut the numbers of hospitals but also the numbers of clinicians while the numbers of patients increased (9). The result was a marked drop in the number of physicians and nurses per VA enrollee (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Nurses (squares) and physicians (diamonds) per 1000 VA enrollees for selected years (10,11).

This data is consistent with a 2011 VA survey that asked VA mental health professionals whether their medical center had adequate mental health staff to meet current veteran demands for care; 71 percent responded no. According to the OIG, VHA’s greatest challenge has been to hire psychiatrists (1). Three of the four sites visited by the OIG had vacant psychiatry positions. One site was trying to replace three psychiatrists who left in the past year. This despite psychiatrists being one of the lowest paid of the medical specialties (12). The VA already has about 1,500 vacancies in mental-health specialties. This prompted Sen. Patty Murray, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs to ask about the new positions, "How are you going to ensure that 1,600 positions ... don't become 1,600 vacancies?" (13).

Administrative Bonuses

A second problem not identified by the OIG is administrative bonuses. Since 1996, wait times have been one of the hospital administrators’ performance measures on which administrative bonuses are based. According to the OIG these numbers are unreliable and frequently “gamed” (1,4-7). This includes directions from VA supervisors to enter incorrect data shortening wait times (4-7).

At a hearing before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs Linda Halliday from the VA OIG said "They need a culture change. They need to hold facility directors accountable for integrity of the data." (13). VA "greatly distorted" the waiting time for appointments, Halliday said, enabling the department to claim that 95 percent of first-time patients received an evaluation within 14 days when, in reality, fewer than half were seen in that time. Nicholas Tolentino, a former mental-health administrative officer at the VA Medical Center in Manchester, N.H., told the committee that managers pressed the staff to see as many veterans as possible while providing the most minimal services possible. "Ultimately, I could not continue to work at a facility where the well-being of our patients seemed secondary to making the numbers look good," he said.

Although falsifying wait times has been known for years, there has been inadequate action to correct the practice according to the VA OIG. Sen. Murray said the findings show a "rampant gaming of the system." (13). This should not be surprising. Clerical personnel who file the data have their evaluations, and in many cases pay, determined by supervisors who financially benefit from a report of shorter wait times. There appears no apparent penalty for filing falsified data. If penalties did exist, it seems likely that the clerks or clinicians would be the ones to shoulder the blame.

The Current System is Ineffective

A repeated pattern of the OIG being called to look at wait times, stating they are false, making recommendations, the VA concurring, and nothing being done has been going on for years (1, 3-7). Based on these previous experiences, the VA will likely be unable to hire the numbers of clinicians needed and wait times will continue to be unacceptably long but will be “gamed” to “make the numbers look good”. Pressure will be placed on the remaining clinicians to do more with less. Some will become frustrated and leave the VA. The administrators will continue to receive bonuses for inaccurate short wait times. If past events hold true, in 2-5 years another VA OIG report will be requested. It will restate that the VA falsified the wait times. This will be followed by a brief outcry, but nothing will be done.

The VA OIG apparently has no real power and the VA administrators have no real oversight. The VA OIG continues to make recommendations regarding additional administrative oversight which smacks of putting the fox in charge of the hen house. Furthermore, the ever increasing numbers of administrators likely rob the clinical resources necessary to care for the patients. Decreased clinical expenses have been shown to increase standardized mortality rates, in other words, hiring more administrators at the expense of clinicians likely contributes to excess deaths (14). Although this might seem obvious, when the decrease of physicians and nurses in the VA began in the mid 1990’s there seemed little questioning that the reduction was an “improvement” in care.

Traditional measures such as mortality, morbidity, etc. are slow to change and difficult to measure. In order to demonstrate an “improvement” in care what was done was to replace outcome measures with process measures. Process measures assess the frequency that an intervention is performed.  The problem appears that poor process measures were chosen. The measures included many ineffective measures such as vaccination with the 23 polyvalent pneumococcal vaccine in adult patients and discharge instructions including advice to quit smoking at hospital discharge (15). Many were based on opinion or poorly done trials, and when closely examined, were not associated with better outcomes. Most of the “improvement” appeared to occur in performance of these ineffective measures. However, these measures appeared to be quite popular with the administrators who were paid bonuses for their performance.

Root Causes of the Problems

The root causes go back to Kizer’s Prescription for Change. The VA decreased the numbers of clinicians, but especially specialists, while increasing the numbers of administrators and patients. The result has been what we observe now. Specialists such as psychiatrists are in short supply. They were often replaced by a cadre of physician extenders more intent on satisfying a checklist of ineffective process measures rather than providing real help to the patient. Waiting times lengthened and the administrative solution was cover up the problem by lying about the data.

VA medical centers are now usually run by administrators with no real medical experience. From the director down through their administrative chain of command, many are insufficiently medically trained to supervise a medical center. These administrators could not be expected to make good administrative decisions especially when clinicians have no meaningful input (10).

The present system is not transparent. My colleagues and I had to go through a FOIA request to obtain data on the numbers of physicians and nurses presented above. Even when data is known, the integrity of the data may be called into question as illustrated by the data with the wait times. 

The falsification of the wait times illustrates the lack of effective oversight. VA administration appears to be the problem and hiring more administrators who report to the same administrators will not solve the problem as suggested by the VA OIG (3-7). What is needed is a system where problems such as alteration of wait times can be identified on the local level and quickly corrected.

Solutions to the Problems

The first and most important solution is to provide meaningful oversight by at the local level by someone knowledgeable in healthcare. Currently, no system is in place to assure that administrators are accountable.  Despite concurring with the multitude of VA OIG’s recommendations, VA central office and the Veterans Integrated Service Networks have not been effective at correcting the problem of falsified data. In fact, their bonuses also depend on the data looking good. Locally, there exists a system of patient advocates and compliance officers but they report to the same administrators that they should be overseeing. The present system is not working. Therefore, I propose a new solution, the concept of the physician ombudsman. The ombudsman would be answerable to the VA OIG’s office. The various compliance officers, patient advocates, etc. should be reassigned to work for the ombudsman and not for the very people that they should be scrutinizing.

The physician ombudsman should be a part-time clinician, say 20% at a minimum. The latter is important in maintaining local clinical knowledge and identifying falsified clinical data. One of the faults of the present VA OIG system is that when they look at a complaint, they seem to have difficulty in identifying the source of the problem (16). Local knowledge would likely help and clinical experience would be invaluable. For example, it would be hard to say waiting times are short when the clinician ombudsman has difficulty referring a patient to a specialist at the VA or even booking a new or returning patient into their own clinic.

The overseeing ombudsman needs to have real oversight power, otherwise we have a repeat of the present system where problems are identified but nothing is done. Administrators should be privileged similar to clinicians. Administrators should undergo credentialing and review. This should be done by the physician ombudsman’s office.  Furthermore, the physician ombudsman should have the capacity to suspend administrative privileges and decisions that are potentially dangerous. For example, cutting the nursing staffing to dangerous levels in order to balance a budget might be an example of a situation where an ombudsman could rescind the action.

The paying of administrative bonuses for clinical work done by clinicians should stop. Administrators do not have the necessary medical training to supervise clinicians, and furthermore, do nothing to improve efficiency or clinically benefit Veterans (14). The present system only encourages further expansion of an already bloated administration (17). Administrators hire more administrators to reduce their workload. However, since they now supervise more people, they argue for an increase in pay. If a bonus must be paid, why not pay for something over which the administrators have real control, such as administrative efficiency (18). Perhaps this will stop the spiraling administrative costs that have been occurring in healthcare (17).

These suggestions are only some of the steps that could be taken to improve the chronic falsification of data by administrators with a financial conflict of interest. The present system appears to be ineffective and unlikely to change in the absence of action outside the VA. Otherwise, the repeating cycle of the OIG being called to look at wait times, noting that they are gamed, and nothing being done will continue.

Richard A. Robbins, M.D.*

Editor, Southwest Journal of Pulmonary

            and Critical Care

References

1. http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-12-00900-168.pdf  (accessed 4-26-12).
2. http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2302 (accessed 4-26-12).
3. http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/07/12/08-16728.pdf (accessed 4-26-12).
4. http://www.va.gov/oig/52/reports/2003/VAOIG-02-02129-95.pdf (accessed 4-26-12).
5. http://www.va.gov/oig/54/reports/VAOIG-05-03028-145.pdf (accessed 4-26-12).
6. http://www.va.gov/oig/54/reports/VAOIG-05-03028-145.pdf (accessed 4-26-12).
7. http://www.va.gov/oig/52/reports/2007/VAOIG-07-00616-199.pdf (accessed 4-26-12).
8. www.va.gov/HEALTHPOLICYPLANNING/rxweb.pdf (accessed 4-26-12).
9. http://veterans.house.gov/107th-congress-hearing-archives (accessed 3/18/2012).
10. Robbins RA. Profiles in medical courage: of mice, maggots and Steve Klotz. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;4:71-7.
11. Robbins RA. Unpublished observations obtained from the Department of Veterans Affairs by FOIA request.
12. http://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/compensation/2012/psychiatry (accessed 4-26-12).
13. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2018071724_mentalhealth26.html (accessed 4-26-12).
14. Robbins RA, Gerkin R, Singarajah CU. Correlation between patient outcomes and clinical costs in the VA healthcare system. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;4:94-100.
15. Robbins RA, Klotz SA. Quality of care in U.S. hospitals. N Engl J Med 2005;353:1860-1 [letter].
16. Robbins RA. Mismanagement at the VA: where's the problem? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2011;3:151-3.
17. Woolhandler S, Campbell T, Himmelstein DU. Health care administration in the United States and Canada: micromanagement, macro costs. Int J Health Serv 2004;34:65-78.
18. Gao J, Moran E, Almenoff PL, Render ML, Campbell J, Jha AK. Variations in efficiency and the relationship to quality of care in the Veterans health system. Health Aff (Millwood) 2011;30:655-63.

*The author is a former VA physician who retired July 2, 2011 after 31 years.

The opinions expressed in this editorial are the opinions of the author and not necessarily the opinions of the Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care or the Arizona Thoracic Society.

Reference as: Robbins RA. VA administrators gaming the system. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;4:149-54. (Click here for a PDF version of the editorial)

Mismanagement at the VA: Where’s the Problem?

Reference as: Robbins RA. Mismanagement at the VA: where's the problem? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2011;3:151-3. (Click here for a PDF version of the editorial)

At the time I retired from my last Veterans Administration (VA) position there was an ongoing investigation into alleged mismanagement of non-VA fee care funds at this hospital. The VA Office of Inspector General (VAOIG) report of this investigation was released on November 8, 2011 (1). The VAOIG report is reflective of a wide-ranging problem of administrators making what are fundamentally clinical decisions and not allowing clinicians to determine the best allocation of resources - issues that are not unique to the VA. 

The VAOIG’s report substantiated that the hospital experienced a budget shortfall of $11.4 million in 2010, 20 percent of the 2010 Non-VA Fee Care Program funds. According to the VAOIG report highlights, “The shortfall occurred because the hospital lacked effective pre-authorization procedures for Long Term Acute Hospital fee care. Additionally, staff did not monitor inpatient fee care patients to determine if the patients could receive services in a VA facility”. As someone who spent about 1 week a month in the intensive care unit and cared for several of the patients who ultimately were transferred to receive long term acute hospital fee care, these recommendations seem inconsistent with the facts.

The purpose of the Non-VA Fee Care Program is to assist Veterans who cannot easily receive care at a VA medical facility. This program pays the medical care costs of patients to non-VA providers when the VA is unable to provide specific treatments or provide treatment economically. To initiate non-VA care, clinicians sent a consult form to a physician designated by the chief of staff for review. Almost all of the fee care claims were approved. The single, approving physician received hundreds of requests per week and lacked both the expertise and time to perform a detailed review of the requests.

Among the problems singled out by the VAOIG’s report was the use of long term acute care for the purposes of ventilator weaning. The report suggests that there was no determination of whether the VA could provide these services. To my knowledge there was no VA facility that provided long term ventilator care within 100 miles of the hospital.

It is known that predicting the ability to wean a patient from long-term mechanical ventilation is imprecise (2). According to the VAOIG’s report “…30 days was a reasonable limit to attempt ventilator weaning. If the veteran had not weaned in that time, then the [hospital] needed to re-evaluate the appropriateness of continued weaning and consider alternative medical options.” Thirty days is considerably shorter than the 3 months recommended by a collective task force from the American College of Chest Physicians; the American Association for Respiratory Care; and the American College of Critical Care Medicine (2).

The VAOIG report estimated that overspending on long term acute care resulted in $4.5 million of the nearly 12 million dollar in over spending. Although it is not clear how this figure was calculated, it is almost certainly an over estimate of the potential cost savings since these patients require care whether in an acute care facility for weaning or a long-term care facility and is based on a 30 day period rather than a 90 day period of weaning

Later in the VAOIG report two additional problems are identified which more likely explain the overspending: inadequate budgeting and inadequate accounting. Not knowing how much is being spent from an inadequate budget is a problem, but there is also another, more fundamental problem not identified in the VAOIG’s report. Why was there no VA acute care or long term facility available to care for these patients? There is certainly sufficient medical expertise within the VA to perform these services. It seems likely that a comparatively small investment in an appropriate facility could have resulted in considerable savings.

There is no convincing evidence presented in the VAOIG’s report that the non-VA services requested were inappropriate. Yet, the VAOIG’s report suggests replacing the lone, over-worked, part-time clinician with inadequate expertise with a full-time person or committee. These approving official(s) will probably also lack the expertise necessary to make these clinical decisions and do little more than harass clinicians for paperwork and documentation while inadequately reviewing the charts and avoiding responsibility for any decisions.

In response to the discovery of the shortfall, the hospital initiated several interim approaches to save money including a hiring freeze. This seems reasonable, but in the middle of the hiring freeze, administration did hire an assistant director into a newly created position. However, clinical personnel who had left or retired were not replaced. Second, the chief of staff who oversaw this shortfall placed a measure on the clinicians’ performance plan that non-VA fee basis spending be reduced compared to the previous year. Yet, according to the VAOIG’s report, the problem appeared to be inadequate budgeting and accounting rather than overspending. Not surprisingly, morale suffered and was reflected in an employee survey which ranked in the bottom 10% of the VA in 5 of the 6 categories surveyed. In order to improve these scores, the chief of staff charged the chiefs of each service with improving morale when the problem appeared to lie a little closer to home. Lastly, the hospital determined that chronic ventilator patients be held in the ICU in order to save non-VA fee expenses. The cost of this decision is that when the ICU is full, that VA patients needing ICU care are transferred to another hospital, a cost paid by the VA. Whether this administrative decision will save money is unknown.

This VAOIG’s report fails to emphasize the major problems, i.e., failure of the administration to work with the clinicians, inadequate budgeting and inadequate accounting. Rather than suggesting reasonable solutions, the VAOIG’s report rewards these administrative blunders by offering increasing administrative control over clinicians and apparently increasing administrative personnel as solutions. These recommendations do nothing other than waste resources which could be used for care of Veteran patients.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor, Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care

References

1. http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-11-02280-23.pdf (accessed 11/17/11).
2. MacIntyre NR, Cook DJ, Ely EW Jr, Epstein SK, Fink JB, Heffner JE, Hess D, Hubmayer RD, Scheinhorn DJ; American College of Chest Physicians; American Association for Respiratory Care; American College of Critical Care Medicine. Evidence-based guidelines for weaning and discontinuing ventilatory support: a collective task force facilitated by the American College of Chest Physicians; the American Association for Respiratory Care; and the American College of Critical Care Medicine. Chest 2001;120:375S-95S.

Editor’s note: Since this budget shortfall came to light, the hospital director retired for medical reasons; the chief of staff was transferred to another VISN as VISN chief medical officer; and the associate director has left the hospital.

The opinions expressed in this editorial are the opinions of the author and not necessarily the opinions of the Southwest Journal of Pulmonary and Critical Care or the Arizona Thoracic Society.