Comparisons between Medicare Mortality, Readmission and Complications

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

Richard D. Gerkin, MD ^‡ 

*Phoenix Pulmonary and Critical Care Research and Education Foundation, Gilbert, AZ

^‡Banner Good Samaritan Medical Center, Phoenix, AZ

Abstract

The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has been a leading advocate of evidence-based medicine. Recently, CMS has begun adjusting payments to hospitals based on hospital readmission rates and “value-based performance” (VBP). Examination of the association of Medicare bonuses and penalties with mortality rates revealed that the hospitals with better mortality rates for heart attacks, heart failure and pneumonia had significantly greater penalties for readmission rates (p<0.0001, all comparisons). A number of specific complications listed in the CMS database were also examined for their correlations with mortality, readmission rates and Medicare bonuses and penalties. These results were inconsistent and suggest that CMS continues to rely on surrogate markers that have little or no correlation with patient-centered outcomes.

Introduction

Implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) emphasized the use of evidence-based measures of care (1). However, the scientific basis for many of these performance measures and their correlation with patient-centered outcomes such as mortality, morbidity, length of stay and readmission rates have been questioned (2-6). Recently, CMS has begun adjusting payments based on readmission rates and “value-based performance” (VBP) (7). Readmission rates and complications are based on claims submitted by hospitals to Medicare (8).

We sought to examine the correlations between mortality, hospital readmission rates, complications and adjustments in Medicare reimbursement. If the system of determining Medicare reimbursements is based on achievement of better patient outcomes, then one hypothesis is that lower readmission rates would be associated with lower mortality.  An additional hypothesis is that complications would be inversely associated with both mortality and readmission rates. 

Methods

Hospital Compare

Data was obtained from the CMS Hospital Compare website from December 2012-January 2013 (8). The data reflects composite data of all hospitals that have submitted claims to CMS. Although a number of measures are listed, we recorded only readmissions, complications and deaths since many of the process of care measures have not been shown to correlate with improved outcomes. Patient satisfaction was not examined since higher patient satisfaction has been shown to correlate with higher admission rates to the hospital, higher overall health care expenditures, and increased mortality (9). In some instances data are presented in Hospital Compare as higher, lower or no different from the National average. In this case, scoring was done 2, 0 and 1 respectively with 0=higher, 2=lower and 1=no different.

Mortality

Mortality was obtained from Hospital Compare and is the 30-day estimates of deaths from any cause within 30 days of a hospital admission for patients hospitalized for heart attack, heart failure, or pneumonia regardless of whether the patient died while still in the hospital or after discharge. The mortality and rates are adjusted for patient characteristics including the patient’s age, gender, past medical history, and other diseases or conditions (comorbidities) the patient had at hospital arrival that are known to increase the patient’s risk of dying.

Readmission Rates

Similarly, the readmission rates are 30-day estimates of readmission for any cause to any acute care hospital within 30 days of discharge. These measures include patients who were initially hospitalized for heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. Similar to mortality, the readmission measures rates are adjusted for patient characteristics including the patient’s age, gender, past medical history, and other diseases or conditions (comorbidities) the patient had at hospital arrival that are known to increase the patient’s risk for readmission.

Complications

CMS calculates the rate for each complication by dividing the actual number of self-reported outcomes at each hospital by the number of eligible discharges for that measure at each hospital, multiplied by 1,000. The composite value reported on Hospital Compare is the weighted averages of the component indicators.  The measures of serious complications reported are risk adjusted to account for differences in hospital patients’ characteristics. In addition, the rates reported on Hospital Compare are “smoothed” to reflect the fact that measures for small hospitals are measured less accurately (i.e., are less reliable) than for larger hospitals.

CMS calculates the hospital acquired infection data from the claims hospitals submit to Medicare. The rate for each hospital acquired infection measure is calculated by dividing the number of infections that occur within any given eligible hospital by the number of eligible Medicare discharges, multiplied by 1,000. The hospital acquired infection rates were not risk adjusted by CMS.

In addition to the composite data, individual complications listed in the CMS database were examined (Table 1).

Table 1. Complications examined that are listed in CMS data base.

Objects Accidentally Left in the Body After Surgery

Air Bubble in the Bloodstream

Mismatched Blood Types

Severe Pressure Sores (Bed Sores)

Falls and Injuries

Blood Infection from a Catheter in a Large Vein

Infection from a Urinary Catheter

Signs of Uncontrolled Blood Sugar

Medicare Bonuses and Penalties

The CMS data was obtained from Kaiser Health News which had compiled the data into an Excel database (10).

Statistical Analysis

Data was reported as mean + standard error of mean (SEM). Outcomes between hospitals rated as better were compared to those of hospitals rated as average or worse using Student’s t-test. The relationship between continuous variables was obtained using the Pearson correlation coefficient. Significance was defined as p<0.05. All p values reported are nominal, with no correction for multiple comparisons.

Results

A large database was compiled for the CMS outcomes and each of the hospital ratings (Appendix 1). There were over 2500 hospitals listed in the database.

Mortality and Readmission Rates

A positive correlation for heart attack, heart failure and pneumonia was found between hospitals with better mortality rates (p<0.001 all comparisons). In other words, hospitals with better mortality rates for heart attack tended to be better mortality performers for heart failure and pneumonia, etc.  Surprisingly, the hospitals with better mortality rates for heart attack, heart failure and pneumonia had higher readmission rates for these diseases (p<0.001, all comparisons).

Examination of the association of Medicare bonuses and penalties with mortality rates revealed that the hospitals with better mortality rates for heart attacks, heart failure and pneumonia received the same compensation for value-based performance as hospitals with average or worse mortality rates (Appendix 2, p>0.05, all comparisons). However, these better hospitals had significantly larger penalties for readmission rates (Figure 1, p<0.0001, all comparisons). 

Figure 1.  Medicare bonuses and penalties for readmission rates of hospitals with better, average or worse mortality for myocardial infarction (heart attack, Panel A), heart failure (Panel B), and pneumonia (Panel C).

Because total Medicare penalties are the average of the adjustment for VBP and readmission rates, the reduction in reimbursement was reflected with higher total penalty rates for hospitals with better mortality rates for heart attacks, heart failure and pneumonia (Figure 2 , p<0.001, all comparisons).

Figure 2.  Total Medicare bonuses and penalties for readmission rates of hospitals with better, average or worse mortality for myocardial infarction (heart attack, Panel A), heart failure (Panel B), and pneumonia (Panel C).

Mortality Rates and Complications

The rates of a number of complications are also listed in the CMS database (Table 1). A correlation was performed for each complication compared to the hospitals with better, average or worse death and readmission rates for heart attacks, heart failure and pneumonia (Appendix 3). A positive correlation of hospitals with better mortality rates was only observed for falls and injuries in the hospitals with better death rates from heart failure (p<0.02). However, severe pressure sores also differed in the hospitals with better mortality rates for heart attack and heart failure, but this was a negative correlation (p<0.05 both comparisons). In other words, hospitals that performed better in mortality performed worse in severe pressure sores. Similarly, hospitals with better mortality rates for heart failure had higher rates of blood infection from a catheter in a large vein compared to hospitals with an average mortality rate (p<0.001). None of the remaining complications differed.

Readmission Rates and Complications

A correlation was also performed between complications and hospitals with better, average and worse readmission rates for myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia (Appendix 4). Infections from a urinary catheter and falls and injuries were more frequent in hospitals with better readmission rates for myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia compared to hospitals with the worse readmission rates (p<0.02, all comparisons). Hospitals with better readmission rates for heart failure also had higher infections from a urinary catheter compared to hospitals with average readmission rates for heart failure (p<0.001). None of the remaining complications significantly differed 

Discussion

The use of “value-based performance” (VBP) has been touted as having the potential for improving care, reducing complications and saving money. However, we identified a negative correlation between deaths and readmissions, i.e., those hospitals with the better mortality rates were receiving larger financial penalties for readmissions and total compensation. Furthermore, correlations of hospitals with better mortality and readmission rates with complications were inconsistent.

Our data compliments and extends the observations of Krumholz et al. (11). These investigators examined the CMS database from 2005-8 for the correlation between mortality and readmissions. They identified an inverse correlation between mortality and readmission rates with heart failure but not heart attacks or pneumonia. However, with the financial penalties now in place for readmissions, it now seems likely hospital practices may have changed.

CMS compensating hospitals for lower readmission rates is disturbing since higher readmission rates correlated with better mortality. This equates to rewarding hospitals for practices leading to lower readmission rates but increase mortality. The lack of correlation for the other half of the payment adjustment, so called “value-based purchasing” is equally disturbing since if apparently has little correlation with patient outcomes.

Although there is an inverse correlation between mortality and readmissions, this does not prove cause and effect. The causes of the inverse association between readmissions and mortality rates are unclear, but the most obvious would be that readmissions may benefit patient survival. The reason for the lack of correlation between mortality and readmission rates with most complication rates is also unclear. VBP appears to rely heavily on complications that are generally infrequent and in some cases may be inconsequential. Furthermore, many of the complications are for all intents and purposes self-reported by the hospitals to CMS since they are based on claims data. However, the accuracy of these data has been called into question (12,13). Meddings et al. (13) studied urinary tract infections. According to Meddings, the data were “inaccurate” and not were “not valid data sets for comparing hospital acquired catheter-associated urinary tract infection rates for the purpose of public reporting or imposing financial incentives or penalties”. The authors proposed that the nonpayment by Medicare for “reasonably preventable” hospital-acquired complications resulted in this discrepancy. Inaccurate data may lead to the lack of correlation a complication and outcomes on the CMS database.

According to the CMS website the complications were chosen by “wide agreement from CMS, the hospital industry and public sector stakeholders such as The Joint Commission (TJC) , the National Quality Forum (NQF), and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) , and hospital industry leaders” (7). However, some complications such as air bubble in the bloodstream or mismatched blood types are quite rare. Others such as signs of uncontrolled blood sugar are not evidence-based (14). Other complications actually correlated with improved mortality or readmission rates. It seems likely that some of the complications might represent more aggressive treatment or could reflect increased clinical care staffing which has previously been associated with better survival (14,15). 

There are several limitations to our data. First and foremost, the data are derived from CMS Hospital Compare where the data has been self-reported by hospitals. The validity and accuracy of the data has been called into question (12,13). Second, data are missing in multiple instances. For example, data from Maryland were not present. There were multiple instances when the data were “unavailable” or the “number of cases are too small”. Third, in some instances CMS did not report actual data but only higher, lower or no different from the National average. Fourth, much of the data are from surrogate markers, a fact which is puzzling when patient-centered outcomes are available. In addition, some of these surrogate markers have not been shown to correlate with outcomes.

It is unclear if CMS Hospital Compare should be used by patients or healthcare providers when choosing a hospital. At present it would appear that the dizzying array of data reported overrelies on surrogate markers which are possibly inaccurate. Lack of adequate outcomes data and even obfuscating the data by reporting the data as average, below or above average does little to help shareholders interpret the data. The failure to apparently incorporate mortality rates as a component of VBP is another major limitation. The accuracy of the data is also unclear. Until these shortcomings can be improved, we cannot recommend the use of Hospital Compare by patients or providers.

References

1. Obama B. Securing the future of American health care. N Engl J Med. 2012; 367:1377-81.
2. Showalter JW, Rafferty CM, Swallow NA, Dasilva KO, Chuang CH. Effect of standardized electronic discharge instructions on post-discharge hospital utilization. J Gen Intern Med. 2011;26(7):718-23.
3. Heidenreich PA, Hernandez AF, Yancy CW, Liang L, Peterson ED, Fonarow GC. Get With The Guidelines program participation, process of care, and outcome for Medicare patients hospitalized with heart failure. Circ Cardiovasc Qual Outcomes. 2012 ;5(1):37-43.
4. Hurley J, Garciaorr R, Luedy H, Jivcu C, Wissa E, Jewell J, Whiting T, Gerkin R, Singarajah CU, Robbins RA. Correlation of compliance with central line associated blood stream infection guidelines and outcomes: a review of the evidence. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2012;4:163-73.
5. Robbins RA, Gerkin R, Singarajah CU. Relationship between the Veterans Healthcare Administration Hospital Performance Measures and Outcomes. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2011;3:92-133.
6. Padrnos L, Bui T, Pattee JJ, Whitmore EJ, Iqbal M, Lee S, Singarajah CU, Robbins RA. Analysis of overall level of evidence behind the Institute of Healthcare Improvement ventilator-associated pneumonia guidelines. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2011;3:40-8.
7. http://www.medicare.gov/HospitalCompare/Data/linking-quality-to-payment.aspx (accessed 4/8/13).
8. http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/ (accessed 4/8/13).
9. Fenton JJ, Jerant AF, Bertakis KD, Franks P. The cost of satisfaction: a national study of patient satisfaction, health care utilization, expenditures, and mortality. Arch Intern Med. 2012;172:405-11.
10. http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Value-Based-Purchasing-And-Readmissions-KHN.csv (accessed 4/8/13).
11. Krumholz HM, Lin Z, Keenan PS, Chen J, Ross JS, Drye EE, Bernheim SM, Wang Y, Bradley EH, Han LF, Normand SL. Relationship between hospital readmission and mortality rates for patients hospitalized with acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, or pneumonia. JAMA. 2013;309(6):587-93. doi: 10.1001/jama.2013.333.
12. Robbins RA. The emperor has no clothes: the accuracy of hospital performance data. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2012;5:203-5.
13. Meddings JA, Reichert H, Rogers MA, Saint S, Stephansky J, McMahon LF. Effect of nonpayment for hospital-acquired, catheter-associated urinary tract infection: a statewide analysis. Ann Intern Med. 2012;157:305-12.
14. NICE-SUGAR Study Investigators. Intensive versus conventional insulin therapy in critically ill patients. N Engl J Med. 2009;360:1283-97.
15. Robbins RA, Gerkin R, Singarajah CU. Correlation between patient outcomes and clinical costs in the va healthcare system. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2012;4:94-100.

Reference as: Robbins RA, Gerkin RD. Comparisons between Medicare mortality, morbidity, readmission and complications. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2013;6(6):278-86. PDF

In Vitro Versus In Vivo Culture Sensitivities: An Unchecked Assumption?

Vinay Prasad, MD*

Nancy Ho, MD^‡

*Medical Oncology Branch

National Cancer Institute

National Institutes of Health

Bethesda, Maryland.

vinayak.prasad@nih.gov

^‡Department of Medicine

University of Maryland 

Case Presentation

A patient presents to urgent care with the symptoms of a urinary tract infection (UTI). The urinalysis is consistent with infection, and the urine culture is sent to lab.  In the interim, a physician prescribes empiric treatment, and sends the patient home. Two days later, the culture is positive for E. coli, resistant to the drug prescribed (Ciprofloxacin, Minimum Inhibitory Concentration (MIC) 64 μg/ml), but attempts to contact the patient (by telephone) are not successful. The patient returns the call two weeks later to say that the infection resolved without sequelae.

Discussion

Many clinicians have the experience of treatment success in the setting of known antibiotic resistance, and, conversely, treatment failure in the setting of known sensitivity. Such anomalies and empiric research described here forces us to revisit assumptions about the relationship between in vivo and in vitro drug responses. 

When it comes to the utility of microbiology cultures, other writers have questioned cost effectiveness and yield (1). Though it is considered a quality measure by some groups in the United States, routine blood cultures seldom change antibiotic choice (3.6%) in patients who present to the emergency room with the clinical and radiographic signs of pneumonia (2)

The objection here is different, but fundamental. Even when culture sensitivities suggest we should change antibiotics, what empirical evidence is there that such changes are warranted? It is by no means a novel doubt. In 1963, at the dawn of in vitro sensitivity techniques, one group questioned their utility to predict clinical outcomes:

“Several objections may be raised…. First, local or host defense mechanisms may act in synergism or antagonism with the antibiotic.  Second, the concentration of antibiotic in tissue fluids, specifically blood, might bear no relation to the concentration at the site of infection…” (3)

And, while substantial pharmacologic progress has been made to ensure proper tissue concentrations, few empirical studies have sought to address the first concern (4). Recent examples suggest the relationship between in vitro and in vivo outcomes may be questionable.

One study of H. pylori tackled this issue (5). Macrolide and metronidazole resistance were determined in lab, and a urea breath test assessed clinical response. Interestingly, treatment with a clarithromycin regiment failed in 77% of persons with clarithromycin-resistant H. pylori compared with 13% of those with clarithromycin-susceptible isolates (relative risk, 6.2 [CI, 1.9 to 37.1]; P < 0.001).  While treatment with metronidazole-based therapy failed in 11% of those with metronidazole-resistant isolates and 38% of those with metronidazole-susceptible isolates (P > 0.25). 

These results suggest that metronidazole susceptibility wholly lacks clinical utility, while clarithromycin sensitivity may be useful. To fully prove the utility of clarithromycin sensitivity testing the authors should show a higher cure rate with a different regiment, and then demonstrate that upfront screening is preferable to empiric treatment and observation.  

Another study suggests that for some organisms and infections— Acanthamoeba keratitis—there exists no relationship at all between in vitro drug sensitivities and the in vivo response (6).

For some conditions, knowing that a causative organism is susceptible in vitro does in fact predict clinical response. For instance, a large study of gram-negative infections treated with cefotaxime found that as the MIC increased, from <4 μg/ml to 64 μg/ml (in vitro), the rate of clinical response fell from 91% to 50% (4). Thus, nearly all patients with susceptible organisms (low MIC) were successfully treated. But, perhaps, what is most interesting about this study is that even resistant organisms were effectively treated in 50% of patients. This finding is supported by work in urinary tract infections, which similarly found a high percentage of clinical response (>80%), even among patients whose causative organisms were resistant to prescribed agents (7).

Basic studies are required for bacteremia, pneumonia, urinary tract infections, endocarditis, and others. To do this work, we should not use our words interchangeably. Treatment failure must refer to an independent clinical outcome and not defined circularly as antibiotic resistance. As of today, faith that in vitro results predict in vivo outcomes remains an unchecked assumption whose treatment implications remain vast and reaching. 

References

1. Glerant JC, Hellmuth D, Schmit JL, Ducroix JP, Jounieaux V. Utility of blood cultures in community-acquired pneumonia requiring hospitalization: influence of antibiotic treatment before admission. Respir Med. 1999;93:208-12.
2. Kennedy M, Bates DW, Wright SB, Ruiz R, Wolfe RE, Shapiro NI. Do emergency department blood cultures change practice in patients with pneumonia? Ann Emerg Med. 2005;46:393-400.
3. Petersdorf RG, Plorde JJ. The usefulness of in vitro sensitivity tests in antibiotic therapy. Annu Rev Med. 1963;14:41-56.
4. Doern GV, Brecher SM. The Clinical Predictive Value (or Lack Thereof) of the Results of In Vitro Antimicrobial Susceptibility Tests. J Clin Microbiol. 2011;49:S11-S4.
5. McMahon BJ, Hennessy TW, Bensler JM, et al. The relationship among previous antimicrobial use, antimicrobial resistance, and treatment outcomes for Helicobacter pylori infections. Ann Intern Med. 2003;139:463-9.
6. Perez-Santonja JJ, Kilvington S, Hughes R, Tufail A, Matheson M, Dart JK. Persistently culture positive acanthamoeba keratitis: in vivo resistance and in vitro sensitivity. Ophthalmology. 2003;110:1593-600.
7. Alizadeh Taheri P, Navabi B, Shariat M. Neonatal urinary tract infection: clinical response to empirical therapy versus in vitro susceptibility at Bahrami Children's Hospital- Neonatal Ward: 2001-2010. Acta Med Iran. 2012;50:348-52.

Reference as: Prasad V, Ho N. In vitro versus in vivo culture sensitivities: an unchecked assumption? Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2013;6(3):125-7. PDF

Profiles in Medical Courage: Thomas Kummet and the Courage to Fight Bureaucracy

“You can’t fight city hall”-Unknown.

Abstract

Thomas Kummet was an oncologist wrongly accused in his mind of delivering substandard care. His fight for correcting what he believed to be a mistake illustrates the difficulty physicians face when challenging the current peer review system. In an attempt to defend his reputation he filed suit which was eventually dismissed by a Federal Court. His frustration over the futility of his fight is illustrative of the difficulties many physicians have faced in fighting a large bureaucracy and an unsympathetic justice system.

Introduction

Thomas Kummet (Figure 1) was an oncologist at the Phoenix Veterans Administration (VA) Medical Center.

Figure 1. Dr. Thomas Kummet

 He had been chief of oncology/hematology for nearly 20 years and was well-respected by his colleagues, staff and students. He was regarded as an excellent clinician. During his 20 years at the VA he no law suits or adverse actions. While attending on general medicine, the deaths of two patients launched a series of events leading Dr. Kummet to eventually file suit against the VA.

Case Presentations

Case 1

A 72 year old male patient was admitted to the surgical critical care (SICU) unit after being found comatose on the surgical ward.  He had undergone surgery for peripheral vascular disease 3 days earlier, but the resident physician failed to order monitoring of his warfarin therapy. At the time of the transfer, his prothrombin time was markedly elevated and a cat scan showed a large intracranial hemorrhage.  The surgery resident stated to the family that the diagnosis was disseminated intravascular coagulation as a complication of the surgery. Shortly after transfer to the SICU the patient expired.  The attending intensivist, a medical internist informed the family of the true cause of the bleeding which led to the patient’s death. The family sued, and received a settlement before trial.

In accordance with hospital policy, the chart was sent to the surgery service for review. The surgery service selected the intensivist as being responsible, who learned of that action only much later, when the state of Arizona began an investigation and placed the intensivist’s name on its public website as a physician guilty of malpractice.

Case 2

JV was a 67-year-old man who was admitted from dialysis clinic to the Internal Medicine Service in August 1999 with a history of non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, end stage renal disease with dialysis, hypertension, anemia of chronic disease, and chronic ulcerations of the feet.  He had developed progressive ascites for several weeks, and had been feeling weak and tired. JV was admitted with a systolic blood pressure of 87 mm Hg, a WBC count of 20,000 cells/mm³, and fever. A medical workup was begun to find the source of a possible sepsis syndrome. The vascular surgery service was consulted with regard to a wound on the patient's left arm which had been the result of an attempted placement for a dialysis access which had failed to mature.  The patient was evaluated and found to have a seroma which was subsequently drained without any complications.  During follow up, it was noted that the patient had a gangrenous left foot with non-reconstructible peripheral vascular disease. Subsequently a below the knee guillotine amputation was performed.

However, JV continued to have intermittent hypotension and fever. In addition to broad spectrum antibiotics he was receiving enoxaparin 30 mg daily as DVT prophylaxis.  On the first postoperative day the consulting intensivist recommended a thoracentesis of a left pleural effusion followed by a paracentesis to exclude these as a source of infection. The thoracentesis and paracentesis were performed without incident. Approximately 2 liters of clear ascitic fluid was removed from the right upper quadrant. About 2 hours after the procedure, the patient experienced the acute onset of abdominal pain, a sudden decrease in blood pressure, a rigid abdomen, apnea and a Code Arrest was called.  He was successfully resuscitated.  His hemoglobin was noted to have decreased from 11 to 7.9 gm/dl.

JV was taken emergently to the operating room where a damage control laparotomy was initiated and a massive hemoperitoneum was noted.  This was evacuated and a vessel on the right upper abdominal wall was identified and ligated. During the exploration it was noted that while the cirrhotic liver was unmarked, but the stomach had a 1 cm perforated ulcer in the anterior wall which was bleeding briskly. This was oversewn and then patched with omentum. During the resuscitation, he received seven units of red blood cells, seven units of fresh frozen plasma, and multiple infusions of crystalloids and colloid solutions in an attempt to maintain blood pressure. A Swan-Ganz pulmonary artery catheter was inserted and fluid resuscitation was guided by pulmonary artery catheter indices.  After adequate fluid resuscitation, he remained hypotensive with a low cardiac index and was supported with a combination of vasopressor agents and inotropes including super maximal doses of dobutamine, dopamine, phenylephrine and norepinephrine.  However, he remained hypotensive, and with the family at his bedside and after a detailed discussion, the family elected to cease support.  The patient died shortly afterwards.

Pertinent Laboratory

His creatinine was 3.2 mg/dL and his blood urea nitrogen was 37 mg/dL. Both his pleural fluid and ascitic fluid were exudative. Blood cultures and peritoneal cultures were all negative. His prothrombin time at the time of his paracentesis was slightly elevated at 13.8 seconds (upper limits of normal 13.3) but partial thromboplastin time and platelet count were within normal limits.

Hospital Course and Surgical Review

When the surgical team was contacted regarding the sudden drop in blood pressure and rigid abdomen, they accused the medicine team of “puncturing” the patient’s liver by the paracentesis with the family present. The family then confronted the resident and intern who performed the paracentesis for this “screw up”. Relevant is that this surgical team is the same that had recently been responsible for the events in case one.  

Since the patient expired on the surgical service, the chart in case 2 was again sent to the surgical service to assess attending responsibility. The medical attending at the time of the patient’s initial admission was selected as the responsible physician, again without any knowledge or input from that medical attending.

JV’s family had hired an attorney who hired a nephrologist in private practice from Tarzana, CA to review the case. The physician opined that the paracentesis should not have been performed because of an excess bleeding risk and the patient died as a result of the paracentesis. The physician did not mention the perforated gastric ulcer which was bleeding “briskly” at the time of the operation. A local peer review was conducted and concluded that bleeding was almost certainly from the perforated gastric ulcer and had nothing to do with the paracentesis.

The US Attorney’s Office obtained additional expert opinions from outside the VA who concluded there was no merit to the case and all applicable standards of care were met. Despite these reviews, the US Attorney’s Office settled the case for $250,000. The reason for the decision to settle the case remains unclear.

Local VA Actions

The attending physicians discussed of both cases with the Risk Manager at the Phoenix VA, who dismissed concerns by saying that the hospital needed to maintain its hard-to-recruit-and-retain surgery staff, but that the medical physicians who had been with the hospital for 20 years were less likely to leave.  In addition, the hospital risk manager assured the medical service physicians that the hospital would not report them to the National Practitioner Data Bank, as no one felt they were responsible for malpractice.

New VA regulations were in effect when Case 2 was settled.  Thomas Kummet was the internal medicine attending who was informed by the hospital of the matter for the first time when he was told he had ten days to respond to VA headquarters about the “malpractice” case, and according to the regulations he was entitled to supervised review of the chart and the settlement documents.  However, while he was allowed to see the chart, there were no documents to explain the lawsuit or the rationale for settlement. When the Risk Manager was asked for those documents, it was acknowledged that they would not be provided, no matter what VA regulations stated, as the US Attorney’s office refused to provide them to the hospital. Again Dr. Kummet was assured that the VA did not report physicians to the National Practitioner Data Bank in circumstances where there was no malpractice.

Three VA reviewers found no evidence of malpractice in the management of this patient. However, Dr. Kummet was informed he was being reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank and the State of Arizona as being responsible for a malpractice settlement.

Actions by the State of Arizona Board of Medical Examiners (BOMEX)

After being notified of the NPDB placement, the state BOMEX began their own investigation of Dr. Kummet, after first placing notification on their public website that he and the intensivist in Case 1 were responsible for malpractice.  This prompted patients to begin to ask for details of his “multiple” errors, to be referred to other physicians, and of why he was still allowed to practice. BOMEX asked Dr. Kummet for the medical records, which the local VA refused to provide, claiming Federal law precluded release.  When the state responded that Dr. Kummet’s (only) medical license was therefore at risk, Dr. Kummet hired legal representation.  With that assistance, the hospital sent a copy of the patient’s chart to the BOMEX. 

The state investigation was subsequently completed, no action was taken except to remove the notation on the website that a case was under investigation, and a request by the doctor for the documents of the state’s investigation was denied by BOMEX.

VA Headquarters Actions

The Veterans Administration had come under criticism in the early 2000’s because only 37% of physicians involved in a malpractice settlement were reported to the National Practioner Data Bank (NPDB). The VA initiated a peer review process and began reporting all practioners whose care was judged as substandard to the NPDB. This included some instances of previously settled claims such as Dr. Kummet’s. This new policy was designed to report all physicians because, as it was explained to the local Risk Manager, “it is good for the VA to show that we are tough on physicians.”

After the case was settled, it was referred to John Grippi MD from the Buffalo VA who was heading the VA’s peer review. He referred the case to a non-VA panel consisting of Edmond Gicewicz MD, a retired general surgeon; Norbert Kuberka MD, a retired oncologist; and Gregory Czajka PA, a surgical assistant. The panel concluded that “technical errors in the performance of abdominal paracentesis resulted in significant intra-abdominal hemorrhage”.

Dr. Kummet’s name was submitted to the National Practioner Data Bank, 10 days after he was first informed of the claim settlement and 4 years after the patient’s death.

Legal Action

Dr. Kummet obtained legal counsel and suit was filed in Federal court since the VA is a Federal agency. The suit failed, however, as there is no statutory or case law that required the local institution to follow its own procedures, or to allow physicians due process claims in these matters.

The legal proceedings were unsuccessful at obtaining any documents to support the decision to report to the NPDB, only to be told what was done was legal and in the VA’s best interest. The US Attorney’s office responded to a Freedom of Information Act request by supplying one nearly totally redacted document and claimed everything else was protected attorney work product (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Redacted letter from US Attorney’s Office.

Conclusion

Subsequently, Dr. Kummet left the VA system and is in private practice in Washington State. There are multiple instances where hospitals have retaliated against physicians for financial gain or for reporting substandard care (1). However, this does appear to be applicable in this case. If you, the reader, concludes from the case presentation that Dr. Kummet delivered substandard care, then he was justifiably punished.

On the other hand, if you agree the American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases that a abdominal paracentesis should be performed in patients with new-onset ascites (2) and that the patient’s intraperitoneal hemorrhage resulted from the perforated gastric ulcer rather than the paracentesis, then you likely agree with Dr. Kummet that he was falsely accused by the VA’s peer review system.

Dr. Kummel’s experience illustrates that physicians face a hospital peer review and justice system that fails to grant the basic rights to those accused of professional misconduct that it grants to those accused of criminal behavior. These include the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Furthermore, the decision to settle the lawsuit that negatively impacted Dr. Kummet were made by attorneys without the background or knowledge to know if substandard care was delivered.

Regardless, Dr. Kummet should be admired for his courage in fighting what he views as unfair accusations by those more concerned with political perceptions than improvement in healthcare and a legal system unconcerned with slandering his reputation.

Richard A. Robbins, MD*

References

1. Kinney ED. Hospital peer review of physicians: does statutory immunity increase risk of unwarranted professional injury? MSU Journal of Medicine and Law 2009;57:57-89.
2. Runyon BL. Management of adult patients with ascites due to cirrhosis: An update. Hepatology 2009;49:2087–107.

*Dr. Thomas Kummet assisted in the preparation of this manuscript.

Reference as: Robbins RA. Profiles in medical courage: Thomas Kummet and the courage to fight burearcracy. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2013;6(1):29-35. PDF

Profiles in Medical Courage: The Courage to Serve and Jamie Garcia

“I've seen and met angels wearing the disguise of ordinary people living ordinary lives.”-Tracy Chapman, American singer-songwriter

Abstract

Some of our Profiles in Medical Courage series have dealt with the famous, and several such as Barry Marshall and Archie Cochrane are household names in medical circles. However, some physicians, just as courageous, are not so renowned. Jamie Lynn Garcia was one of those who died earlier this year at the age of 52.  She was a devoted servant of the poor and founder of the Pomona Community Health Center. Her road to becoming a physician was not straight-forward but her life story was an extraordinary one.

Early Life

Jamie was raised in the Westchester section of Los Angeles, just north of the Los Angeles International Airport. She had a rather ordinary middle class upbringing in a Hispanic family where her father was a gardener and her mother a realtor. Her parents were strict Catholics and she attended the Catholic schools. She was a bright student but also had a beautiful singing voice that she was encouraged to develop. "As a child she had severe asthma," but there was a physician who helped her, "a doctor who was inspiring." (1). However, with adolescence her asthma improved but other issues were hard on Jamie. After reading the Bible at age 12, she rejected religion, and after passing a high school proficiency exam, left high school at 16 to become a professional musician.

Rock and Roll Years

Jamie used her voice and her instrumental talent on guitar, bass and keyboards in many of the bands in the Los Angeles during the1980’s while supplementing her income as a realtor (2). These bands followed her eclectic tastes and included country, jazz and pop but the most successful band was the all girl rock band “On the Air”. They had gigs throughout Los Angeles, aired videos on VH1, and garnered the attention of major record labels. However, the band collapsed when the lead singer decided to pursue an education. Several of Jamie’s friends, encouraged Jamie to do the same. Thinking that they might be right, she decided to go to college with no particular goal in mind.

Education

She enrolled at Santa Monica Community College and later transferred to UCLA where she majored in philosophy. During her later years in college she recalled her childhood doctor who treated her asthma. She thought, “I could do that”, and applied to medical school. She attended the University of Washington. There she meant her partner for the next 15 years, Dr. Sue Verrault, a child psychologist. After graduation, Jamie returned to the Los Angeles area for a family practice residency at Pomona Valley Hospital.

As a resident she was moved by what she saw as an enormous need for healthcare of low-income patients, especially those with chronic conditions such as heart disease, diabetes, and asthma. Dr. Jamie, as her patients came to call her, was a compassionate physician, but her faculty noted she spent too much time with patients, especially psychiatric patients. Fearless and confident, she occasionally liberated hospital supplies and took them to the streets to treat the homeless. During her last year in residency, she heard of a homeless man living under a nearby freeway bridge who was in dire need of medical care (2). She crawled under the bridge to find him, and convinced him to come with her back to the hospital. She enrolled him in a treatment program for alcoholics, after which he remained sober.

Pomona Community Health Center

At the time many of the ER’s and clinics were closing in East Los Angeles and she recognized that the inadequacy of the healthcare system to serve the healthcare needs of the poor. While still a resident Jamie partnered with the LA County Department of Public Health to operate the original Pomona Community Health Center, a two-room free clinic serving the homeless, uninsured, and underinsured in east LA County. After completing residency, she continued the clinic with the help of Federal grants (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Dr. Jamie Lynn Garcia (right) with patient at the Pomona Community Health Center.

The next 8 years were difficult. Money was tight but Jamie dreamed of a larger clinic and began the long process of planning the clinic’s expansion. She had no formal training or experience with such a large project, but assembled a board and staff, sketched out each exam room and calculated the cost of materials, planned budgets for doctors, created partnerships to secure a location, and raised over $1.4 million from Federal and other sources.  In 2010 she secured the crucial seed money to build the new clinic and proudly exclaimed on her Facebook page, "We're buildin' a free clinic! We have liftoff!"

Declining Health

Jamie had the fault of many physicians; she often ignored her own health. She had abdominal pain off and on beginning in 2005. When she finally had time to get an abdominal ultrasound in 2008, an ovarian mass was found but it appeared benign and Jamie was too busy to have it investigated. When she got around to a follow-up ultrasound 2 years later, the mass had doubled in size and she was diagnosed with an aggressive form of ovarian cancer. On May 16, 2011, while undergoing chemotherapy she oversaw the groundbreaking ceremony for the new clinic's building on Holt Avenue, in The Village, a "mall" of social services for low income LA residents. She was determined to beat the cancer and complete the new, expanded clinic and live to see it open. "I can't wait to meet the first patient," she told the Inland Valley Daily Bulletin at the groundbreaking (1).

She continued to run the clinic and oversee the construction of the new clinic despite her ongoing chemotherapy. The new clinic opened its doors on July 9, 2012 but three days earlier, Dr. Jamie was admitted to the hospital where she learned she had a large inoperable tumor.  She was advised to prepare for hospice care. On July 27 she died peacefully in her home but had lived to see the clinic open. She was 52.

Legacy

Dr. Garcia received numerous awards (2). She was named Woman of the Year in 2010 by the California State Assembly, a Hospital Hero in 2010 by the National Health Foundation, and her clinic has been recognized by the California State Assembly, National Project Homeless Connect, and the House of Ruth Domestic Violence Shelter. The evening before she died, several doctors from her clinic gathered at Jamie's home and agreed to hang her numerous recognitions on an otherwise-blank wall in the new clinic. "But I don't know, honestly, if there's room for all of them," noted one doctor.

The new 12-room clinic opened its doors on July 9, 2012, and is expected to serve 24,000 uninsured, homeless, and underinsured residents in the Pomona area this year (2). However, her most enduring legacy may be her example in serving the poor. She should be remembered for her enthusiasm, courage and perseverance in making her dream happen. She is representative of the many physicians and other healthcare providers who forgo larger financial awards to serve the poor in relative obscurity. Her life is testimony that "anything is possible" (2).

References

1. Rodriquez M. Garcia helped those who struggled. Inland Valley Daily Bulletin. August 10, 2012. Available at: http://www.dailybulletin.com/news/ci_21288514/garcia-helped-those-who-struggled (accessed 9-10-12).
2. Marks R. RIP Jamie Garcia, a health hero in Pomona, 2010 California Woman of the Year. Off Ramp. August 10, 2012. Available at: http://www.scpr.org/blogs/offramp/2012/08/10/9379/rip-jamie-garcia-health-hero-pomona-2010-californi/ (accessed 9-10-12).

Donations in Dr. Garcia's memory can be made to the Pomona Community Health Center: 1450 E Holt Avenue, Pomona, CA 91767.

Reference as: Robbins RA. Profiles in medical courage: the courage to serve and Jamie Garcia. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;5:231-4. PDF

Profiles in Medical Courage: Women’s Rights and Sima Samar

“A state that does not educate and train women is like a man who only trains his right arm.”

― Jostein Gaarder, Sophie's World

Richard A Robbins, MD

Phoenix Pulmonary and Critical Care Research and Education Foundation

Abstract

Previous profiles have focused on physicians who placed their careers in jeopardy to follow their beliefs. Sima Samar is different because she has not only risked her career, but her life.  She has shown extraordinary courage in ignoring death threats and defying religious misogynists to ensure that Afghan girls and women had access to health care and education. Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Dr. Samar became the first woman appointed to a cabinet position in the interim Afghan government. Ousted by religious conservatives, she serves today as the chair of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.

Early Lessons

Samar was born on February 3, 1957 in Jaghori, a major business center situated in the highlands of central Afghanistan. Her father, Qadam Ali, was a civil servant and her mother, Khurshid, was the first of his two wives. She was one of eleven children and a member of Afghanistan's Hazara ethnic minority. The Hazara are a mountain tribe of Shiite Muslims who have been long oppressed by the Sunni majority.  

During Samar’s childhood, women could receive an education. Samar was sent to school and recalls first noticing ethnic tension in the second grade (1). She was mocked by her Sunni teacher for naming a Muslim holy man in the minority Hazara dialect.

Although Afghan women could vote and often held such prominent positions including judges or governmental ministers, they were still subject to a paternalistic society. Arranged marriages, encumbering restrictions, and husbands with multiple wives were common. "My brothers had more freedom than me in every way," Samar recalled to Alex Spillius of the London Daily Telegraph (2). "They could go where they wanted outside the house." Some of her memories were even more distressing. Her elder sister, Aziza, resisted an arranged marriage to a cousin. “Aziza was only 17 years old," Samar told Sally Armstrong (3). "I remember seeing my mother drag her by her hair to the room where our cousin waited and force her to marry him." Aziza died an unhappy woman at age 21, but before she did, she gave her little sister two words of advice- "Study hard".

Samar took her sister's guidance to heart and threw herself into her studies to avoid a similar fate. She became an avid reader, especially devouring Persian books about improving the lot of women and the poor. Her hard work was eventually recognized. Upon graduation from high school in 1975, she was offered scholarships to attend college in both Australia and Hungary. However, Samar's father forbade her to accept either scholarship to study abroad because unmarried women were not allowed to leave home. Even her acceptance at Kabul University was in jeopardy. To receive her father’s approval, she agreed to an arranged marriage to a man of her father’s choice to continue her education.

Kabul and Political Upheaval

Her father’s selection of a husband proved to be a good one. In 1975, at the age of 18, Samar married physics professor Abdul Chafoor Sultani. Luckily, Sultani was supportive of his wife's academic goals, and she genuinely admired him. The couple set off for Kabul University, and began a quiet existence where Sultani was a physics professor and Samar attended medical school. Together they did the cooking, the housework and raised their newborn son.

However, politics disrupted their quiet life. The late 70’s were a tumultuous time in Afghanistan. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan came to power through the Saur Revolution in 1978. Their rule proved highly unpopular not only within Afghanistan, but also the neighboring Soviet Union. The Soviet Union invaded and installed a puppet government in their place. Sultani and Samar joined the resistance movement fighting Afghanistan's Soviet rule, but the couple's political activism came at a high price. Late one night in 1979, Sutani and three of his brothers were kidnapped by 10 men. They were never seen again. "I still don't know the full who, what and when," Samar told Spillius (2). “Every Friday, we were in front of the big jail from early morning to late evening, hoping for news,” Samar said. “There was no news.”

Her husband's tragic disappearance left Samar alone with a young son and an unfinished education. Leaving her son in the care of her parents, Samar persevered and in 1982 became one of the first Hazara women to obtain a medical degree. After a 4 month residency at Wazir Akbar Khan Hospital, she fled Kabul, retrieved her son and settled in the rural area of Jorhi.  There were no hospitals, no medical facilities, no exam rooms, but there she provided medical treatment to patients throughout the remote areas of central Afghanistan. With only a stethoscope and a blood pressure cuff, she often traveled to see patients on foot or horseback, but gained a first hand knowledge of the hardships they faced. "Practicing medicine in a rural district demonstrated brutally that the lives of women were nearly unbearable," Samar told Armstrong (3), "and that the lack of education was a direct cause of the turmoil the country was in."

Pakistan

In 1984, Samar was stricken with whooping cough and her weight dropped dramatically (4). Unable to find medical care for herself, she traveled to Quetta, the Hazara region of Pakistan. “I went to Quetta for treatment,” she said “but then I realized I could get an education for my son there, and I would be able to get funds to help my work”. Once there, she began her life’s work in earnest. Only one hospital there accepted female patients. With initial funding from the NGO, Inter-Church Aid, she opened a hospital for women and children in 1987. Two years later, she founded the Shuhada (Afghan for martyr) organization, dedicated to women and children's needs (Figure 1). Rauf Akbeari, who would become Samar's second husband, helped oversee the organization's operations.

Figure 1. Panel A: Dr. Sima Samar seeing patients. Panel B: A Shuhada clinic at Kart-e-Sulh in central Afghanistan which serves a population of 9,000.

The Taliban

The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1992 and the United States that had backed the resistance withdrew as well.  Violence and guerilla warfare erupted in the power vacuum. The eventual victors were the Talban, a group of Islamic fundamentalists. Under the Talban’s reign, women lost most of their rights and freedoms. They were denied the right to equality, freedom, the vote, and the abilities to work or inherit. Even highly educated women were forced into slave labor or begging to survive.

Under the auspices of Shuhada, Samar started to open clinics and schools on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Always controversial, her pursuits were now beginning to attract the unwanted attention of the Taliban.  Not surprisingly, Samar's ongoing efforts at educating and uplifting the poor, especially females, were not looked upon favorably. Similarly, her adamant refusals to don the burqa (head to foot dress), observe purdah (seclusion of women from the public), or silence her calls for equality were not appreciated. Indeed, Samar was openly threatened with death if she did not close down her hospitals and schools for women and girls. According to journalist Sally Armstrong, she simply replied, "You know where I am, I won't stop what I'm doing."

True to her word, Samar ignored myriad death threats and fearlessly continued her work. She sometimes relied on trickery, such as operating schools in private homes or posting lower grade levels than were actually taught to circumvent the Taliban’s rules. At other times, she was more openly confrontational. One such instance was when she confronted a Taliban officer who had commandeered a truck loaded with supplies intended for one of her clinics. Coincidentally, the officer's mother had come to Samar for medical treatment around the same time. "It was construction materials . . . and about 6 metric tons of high-protein biscuits from Norway," Samar explained to Steve Lipsher in the Denver Post (5). "They took the whole thing. I told [the officer], "If you don't release my supplies, I'm going to take your mother hostage here in the clinic." The construction materials were returned the next day.

In addition to her social activism, she continued to serve as a physician. She was the first to recognize the increased prevalence of osteomalacia in women wearing burgas, probably due to lack of vitamin D produced by sunlight, .

After the Taliban

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States led to the US invasion of Afghanistan and the ousting of the Taliban. An interim government with Harmid Karzai as the interim president was put into place in December. Much to her surprise, Samar was appointed as one of five deputy prime ministers and the minister of women’s affairs in the new government, becoming the first Afghan woman ever to hold such a high position.

She returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan but her role as women's affairs minister soon presented its own set of challenges. "I knew that it would be difficult," she told journalist Steve Lipsher (5). "I didn't know that it would be this much difficult." She operated out of her own home, had no office, no supplies, no staff and no budget. Women lined up at her door, telling their tales of abuse, forced marriages, and lost jobs but Samar could do nothing.

To make matters worse, she was ignored in cabinet meetings.  Each time a male minister addressed the group, he opened with the phrase, “Brothers, brothers”. Even Karzai used the same phrase. “During the 23 years of war, there were no women in any decision-making, in any policy roles,” she said (6). “The political parties had no women. So they were not used to a woman’s face, a woman’s presence. We had to make a space for ourselves.” So Samar pulled Karzai aside and told him “Brothers, brothers” excluded her and she called for more female ministers in the government, schools for married women, and an end to arranged marriages. "After the meetings," she told Spillius (2), "people say I make too much noise, so I say: why did they appoint me? I am not confrontational . . . that doesn't work . . . but I have to say what I want for women."

She was no more patient with American politicians. She recounts a meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington (7). She told Powell, “…please do not repeat the mistakes that you made before… You created these monsters [the Taliban]. Please don’t support them again.” She also chastised him for not being supportive of the Afghan government, spending money on war rather than rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure and having too few US miliary women in Afghanistan. She was no more polite when Powell and Congressional delegations visited Afghanistan (Figure 2).

Figure 2. US Senator Chuck Hagel (left) meeting with President Hamid Karzai (center) and Dr. Sima Samar (right).

In response to her demands, conservatives waged a war of veiled threats and open menace. Matters came to a head in June of 2002 when she was accused of questioning Islam by saying she did not believe in Sharia law in Maujajed’s Message, a Canadian Persian language newspaper (1). Although she vehemently denied the allegation, conservatives ran a front-page headline in a local newspaper calling Samar "Afghanistan's Salman Rushdie," in reference to the Muslim author branded as a heretic by Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the 1980s. The damage was done. With little political support at home or the US, Afghan President Hamad Karzai did not appoint her to his permanent government in June, 2003. Certainly disappointed, but unapologetic, she told Kathy Gannon of the Scotsman (8), "I really don't know what my mistake was. I am a woman, I am outspoken, I am a Hazara. That is enough, I guess."

Although Samar's political career was brief, she seems hardly the kind of woman to remain silent. After leaving her cabinet post, she became chair of the Independent Afghanistan Human Rights Commission, and despite ongoing death threats, she continues to operate the Shuhada hospitals and schools and to speak on behalf of women's and human rights. By 2004, the Shuhada Organization operated four hospitals and 12 clinics in Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with 60 Afghan schools. Internationally recognized for her diligent efforts, she also received many accolades, including the 2003 inaugural Perdita Huston Human Rights Award and the 2004 John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award. It may be that Samar herself described best why her talents and determination might be best suited to a non-political arena when she told Gannon (8), "I believe we cannot change the country with only words. We have to change it with our minds, our hearts and our attitude."

However, her career in politics may not be over quite yet. In 2011 she was one of the founders of the Truth and Justice Party, a multi-ethnic party opposed to President Hamid Karzai’s regime.

References

1. Gale Encyclopedia of Biography: Sima Samar. Available at: http://www.answers.com/topic/sima-samar (accessed 8-24-12).
2. Spillus A. People say I make too much noise: Dr Sima Samar,Afghanistan's first minister for women's affairs, talks to Alex Spillius. The Daily Telegraph. February 22, 2002.
3. Armstrong S. Rebel unveiled. Chatelaine, April 1, 2002. Available at: http://business.highbeam.com/436992/article-1G1-83994864/rebel-unveiled (accessed 8-24-12).
4. Samar S. Despite the odds - providing reproductive health care to Afghan women. N Engl J Med 2004;351:1047-9.
5. Lipsher S. Women's advocate defies the odds Afghan official battles poverty, male culture. Denver Post, January 27, 2002. Available at: http://www.denverpost.com/archives (accessed 8-24-12).
6. Frey J. A Healing Force For Afghan Women; From Her Cabinet Post, Sima Samar Sees a Long, Hard Road Still Ahead. Washington Post, April 24,2002. Available at: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-351850.html (accessed 8-24-12).
7. Cott M, Whelan R. Interview with Dr Sima Samar. International Review of the Red Cross 2010;92:847-57. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2010/irrc-880-interview.pdf (accessed 8-24-12).
8. Gannon K. She was the minister who fought for Afghan women. Now she is dumped. The Scotsman, June 25, 2002. Available at: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-12988802.html (accessed 8-24-12).

Reference as: Robbins RA. Profiles in medical courage: women's rights and Sima Samar. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care 2012;5:197-202. PDF