A Call for Change in Healthcare Governance

Over the past 30-40 years many healthcare organizations have gradually shifted from a charitable, not-for-profit organization to a not-for-profit in name only business. Accompanying this shift, has been a shift in hospital governance away from a benevolent organization directed by charitable organizations such as religious organizations to businessman focused on revenue and profits. Of course, this does not mean that not-for-profit organizations are for loss. Small or modest profits are necessary to continue to operate.

Accompanying this change in organizational goals from a charitable to a more business focus, has been changes in the hospital board of directors or trustees (1). The mission of a publicly traded corporation is to return economic value to their shareholders and is the primary fiduciary focus of that board. On the other hand, the mission of a not-for-profit, 501c, charitable healthcare system is to provide health services improving the well-being of the community.

The board of directors or trustees of a not-for-profit organization theoretically must be primarily focused on the fulfillment of the charitable mission, not on generating profit for its own sake. Not-for-profit boards tend to be larger. In the 1980s the average size of a not-for-profit hospital board was well over 25, but is declining. By 2023 the average size was around 13 (1). At least 51% of the members of a not-for-profit charitable board must meet the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) definition of independence. This means that these board members must be independent of direct economic relationships with the organization and not have direct family members who work for the organization. This is one way that the IRS tries to ensure that the board is loyal to the charitable mission of the organization.

In the 1980’s new board members were often elected by the board and usually received no or minimal compensation (2). However, today board members are often “nominated” by the administration of the hospital and often receive compensation which can be substantial (2). For example, the 14 board members of Banner Health receive in excess of $95,000/year (3). In addition, hospital CEOs were usually ex officio non-voting board members. Again, using Banner Health as an example, the CEO is a full board member (4). Board composition has also changed. In the past there was often ample physicians and nurses providing medical guidance to the board. Today their numbers have dwindled. Banner has  only 2 physicians on its 14-member board (an internist/emergency room and a family physician). Nursing is not represented.

The role of the chief of staff (COS) has also changed. In the past COSs were usually members of the medical faculty who served one or two years on a part-time basis. They were compensated but that was largely to offset their loss of income as a physician. Now COSs are often full-time serving at the pleasure of the hospital CEO and/or board. They are no longer the doctors’ representative to the hospital administration but rather the hospital administration’s representative to the doctors (5). The concept that the COS can work in a “kumbaya” relationship with hospital administrators is a naive remanent from a bygone era. Although a good working relationship may exist in some healthcare organizations, increasingly the relationship is adversarial.

Physician practice has also changed. In the past physicians were often self-employed independents who practiced within the confines of the hospital or clinic. Now 77% of physicians are employed, a dramatic increase from 26% only 10 years ago (6). The reason most often cited has been declining reimbursement (7). Although cost containment is often cited as a reason for the decline, Medicare physician pay has plummeted by 26% when adjusted for inflation over the past 20 years while hospital reimbursement has surged by 70% (7). The decline in reimbursement has prompted many doctors to abandon independent practice for hospital or corporate employment (7). Some have equated increasing physician employment for decreasing access and quality of care (7).

It seems unlikely that without a change in governance any meaningful change in the businessmen’s stranglehold of medicine with its poor care, high prices and administrative overcompensation will be forthcoming. One simple improvement is election of the COS by an independent medical staff rather than appointment by a hospital director or board.

A second, also simple change is that independent doctors, nurses and technicians need to have their representation increased on the board of directors of the hospital or healthcare organization. They should be elected by the hospital staff and not appointed by the CEO. Rather than just requiring 51% of board members be independent, at least 51% of boards should have doctors, nurses or technicians who practice at the hospital or healthcare organization but are independent. This ensures adequate medical expertise including local knowledge about the operation of the organization.

Changes described above to the COS and board of directors should be required by the Joint Commission, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, the state department of health and possibly the IRS. These changes could go a long way to resolving the intrusion in medicine by businessmen interested more in their own gain and not the charitable healthcare mission of a 501c hospital or healthcare organization.

References

1. Wagner SE. A Taxonomy of Health Care Boards. Trustee Insights. American Hospital Association. September, 2023. Available at: https://trustees.aha.org/system/files/media/file/2023/09/TI_0923_orlikoff_interview_3.pdf (accessed 6/14/2024).
2. Blodgett MS, Melconian LJ,  Peterson JH. Evolving Corporate Governance Standards for Healthcare Nonprofits: Is Board of Director Compensation a Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Brooklyn Journal of Corporate Financial & Commercial Law. 2013;7(2): 444-474. Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=bjcfcl (accessed 6/14/2024).
3. ProPublica. Nonprofit Explorer. December 2022 Tax Filing. Available at: https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/450233470 (accessed 6/14/24).
4. Board of Directors. Banner Health. Available at: https://www.bannerhealth.com/about/leadership/board-of-directors (accessed 6/14/24).
5. Robbins RA. The Potential Dangers of Quality Assurance, Physician Credentialing and Solutions for Their Improvement. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care Sleep. 2022;25(4):52-58. [CrossRef]
6. Physicians Advocacy Institute. Updated Report: Hospital and Corporate Acquisition of Physician Practices and Physician Employment 2019-2023. April 2024. Available at: https://www.physiciansadvocacyinstitute.org/Portals/0/assets/docs/PAI-Research/PAI-Avalere%20Physician%20Employment%20Trends%20Study%202019-2023%20Final.pdf?ver=uGHF46u1GSeZgYXMKFyYvw%3d%3d (accessed 6/16/24).
7. G Grossi. Dr David Eagle: CMS Reimbursement Cuts Encourage Trend of Independent Physician Exodus. American Journal of Managed Care. Feb 12, 2024. Available at: https://www.ajmc.com/view/dr-david-eagle-cms-reimbursement-cuts-encourage-trend-of-independent-physician-exodus (accessed 6/16/24).

Cite as: Robbins RA. A Call for Change in Healthcare Governance. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care Sleep. 2024;28(6):91-93. doi: https://doi.org/10.13175/swjpccs028-24 PDF

Improving Quality in Healthcare

Figure 1. Dr. Katz is a little jaded about quality metrics (1).

Everyone is in favor of quality healthcare and improving it. However, to date, initially highly touted quality measures prove to be meaningless metrics in about 5-10 years. That is, when the measures are scientifically studied, they are found to be of little worth. The cycle is then repeated, i.e., new and highly touted measures are again selected and found to be useless in 5-10 years. The latest in this cycle may be the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid’s (CMS) Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). The theory underlying MIPS has been that paying for quality rather than quantity will incentivize healthcare providers to improve quality. As part of the deal creating the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) MIPS was established as a pay for performance system which promised to improve healthcare while reducing costs. However, healthcare costs have continued to rise (2). Data on improvement in quality has been lacking.

Now, Bond et al. (3) have reported a study suggesting that MIPS incentivization of quality improvement in healthcare quality has questionable benefits. Among US primary care physicians in 2019, MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with performance on process and outcome measures. Bond’s study included 3.4 million patients attributed to 80,246 primary care physicians. Physicians were divided into thirds based on their MIPS score. Compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with the lowest MIPS scores had significantly worse mean performance on 3 of 5 process measures: diabetic eye examinations, diabetic HbA1c screening and mammography screening, but significantly better mean performance on rates of influenza vaccination and tobacco screening. MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with risk-adjusted patient outcomes: compared with physicians with the highest MIPS scores, physicians with the lowest MIPS scores had significantly better mean performance on emergency department visits per 1000 patients but worse performance on all-cause hospitalizations, and did not have significantly different performance on 4 ambulatory care-sensitive admission outcomes. Nineteen percent of physicians with the lowest MIPS scores had composite outcomes performance in the top quintile, while 21% of physicians with the highest MIPS scores had outcomes in the bottom quintile. These findings suggest that the MIPS program may be ineffective at measuring and incentivizing quality improvement among US physicians.

It is unclear why improvement  in intermediate surrogate markers is used rather than improvement in outcomes. Bond’s study measured MIPS scores against ER visits and hospitalizations. Patients, providers, insurers, bureaucrats, politicians, taxpayers- in other words, nearly everyone- would agree that reductions in ER visits and hospitalizations is desirable if it can be accomplished without patient harm. Similarly, reduction in unexpected deaths and improvement in patients’ feeling of well being are goals that all can support. However, the goals of healthcare are different depending on which population is asked. Patients might support their well-being, insurance cost, and provider access as being most important, whereas payors might support costs as most important. Providers might support efficiency of care and reimbursement as important. So ultimately what surrogate markers like MIPS do is choose one point of view which often does not affect outcomes (4).

There are many ways to achieve a goal depending on expertise, resources and patient characteristics. Flexibility in care allows the person most likely to understand the efficiencies of their particular system- the providers- to use their local knowledge to benefit the patients. Outside influences emphasizing surrogate markers, cost, or politics have historically failed. Unless one is willing to accept healthcare shown not to benefit patients as acceptable, MIPS should be eliminated. Replacing MIPS with an equally flawed system set of surrogate markers will likely not help.

It seems that outcome measures offer several advantages over process measures. Outcome measures include unexpected mortality, hospital readmissions, safety of care, effectiveness of care, timeliness of care, efficiency of care, and patient well-being (5). These are all thought to be important by patients, insurers, providers and even politicians. In my view, the process leading to these ultimate outcome goals is less important and the process producing the same or similar results will likely vary between providers and hospitals.

CMS should refocus their quality efforts on outcomes rather than processes which have failed as quality indicators. Physicians must decide whether they wish to continue participation in systems such as MIPS and the accompanying increase in paperwork. Unless something changes the trends of increasing paperwork over meaningless metrics will continue.

Richard A. Robbins MD

Editor, SWJPCCS

References

1. Lehmann C. Comics for Docs: Medical Cartoons Poke Fun at Today's Practices. Medscape. July 15, 2022. Available at: https://www.medscape.com/slideshow/medical-cartoons-6015473#2 (accessed (1/12/23).
2. Kurani N, Ortaliza J, Wager E, Fox L, Amin K. How Has U.S. Spending on Healthcare Changed Over Time? Peterson-KFF Health System Trasecker. February 25, 2022. Available at: https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/u-s-spending-healthcare-changed- time/#Total%20national%20health%20expenditures,%20US%20$%20Billions,%201970-2020 (Accessed 1/4/23).
3. Bond AM, Schpero WL, Casalino LP, Zhang M, Khullar D. Association Between Individual Primary Care Physician Merit-based Incentive Payment System Score and Measures of Process and Patient Outcomes. JAMA. 2022 Dec 6;328(21):2136-2146. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
4. Robbins RA, Thomas AR, Raschke RA. Guidelines, recommendations and improvement in healthcare. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2011;2:34-37.
5. Tinker A. The Top Seven Healthcare Outcome Measures and Three Measurement Essentials. Health Catalyst. June 29, 2022. Available at: https://www.healthcatalyst.com/insights/top-7-healthcare-outcome-measures (accessed 1/5/23).

Cite as: Robbins RA. Improving Quality in Healthcare. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care Sleep. 2023;26(1):8-10. doi: https://doi.org/10.13175/swjpccs002-23 PDF

Why Complexity Persists in Medicine

This month’s Medical Image of the Month is a cartoon illustrating the complexity of medical billing (1). It illustrates that there are many people involved in the billing process who add nothing medically. However, they do add work, chaos and cost to both the provider and the patient. These along with other administrative costs are likely responsible for the largest portion of increasing healthcare expenses (2). Healthcare costs have far outpaced inflation and inflation adjusted reimbursement to providers has decreased (3,4). Costs of healthcare have become an increasing issue in political campaigns for both National parties. So why is no one doing anything about the issue? The truth is that some are benefitting from the complexity and have a financial incentive to maintain the status quo by opposing change.

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and state Medicaids need to accept some of the responsibility for these cost increases. There has been a public sentiment doctors are overpaid, so actions taken by CMS and other government agencies have made physicians an easy target for policies that have led to instability in compensation. The declining income of private practice has led many physicians to flee to employed models (4). Not only has CMS contributed to driving physicians from self-employment by underpaying independent physicians but they have over compensated physician employed by hospitals. CMS estimates that it is now paying about $75 to $85 more on average for the same clinic visit in hospital outpatient settings compared to physician offices (5). Not surprisingly, these and other compensation disproportions have led to higher healthcare spending (6).

So, why does CMS rob the independent physicians to pay the hospitals and large healthcare organizations? An answer might be found in the recent actions regarding site-neutral payments. Many hospitals have bought physician and walk-in clinics to take advantage of the increased compensation from CMS and other insurance carriers. When the Trump administration proposed a “site-neutral” policy where payment would be lowered to hospitals and other healthcare organizations employing physicians, the American Hospital Association (AHA) and Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) sued (7). Government agencies are reluctant to challenge hospital, insurance or pharmaceutical companies and their lobbyists who are powerful and well-funded. This gives the appearance that it is much easier to be tough on independent physicians who are poorly organized, politically weak and not likely to sue.

Political tactics have been taken by the pharmaceutical companies who persuaded Congress not to allow US agencies such as CMS and the Department of Veterans Affairs to negotiate drug prices. It was in 2003, under then President George W. Bush, that Congress added a Part D benefit, through which CMS pays for seniors’ prescription drugs. The enactment followed a controversial House roll call vote, which was held open for several hours as House leaders maneuvered to secure enough votes for passage. One bargaining chip to attract votes from “market-oriented” Congressmen was the so-called “noninterference clause” which banned negotiations between CMS and pharmaceutical companies on drug prices and prevented the government from developing its own formulary or pricing structure. In other words, US Government agencies are forced to pay whatever prices the manufacturers set (8).

Sadly, our professional societies have also contributed to rising healthcare costs. An example is the Joint Commission which was formed in 1951 by merging the Hospital Standardization Program with similar programs run by the American College of Physicians, the American Hospital Association (AHA), the American Medical Association, and the Canadian Medical Association. However, the Joint Commission has become dominated the American Hospital Association which has continually pushed a hospital administrative agenda (9). Standards leading to or encouraging administrative efficiency appear nonexistent. Even our own professional societies have fixated on programs such as Choosing Wisely which emphasizes physicians not performing unnecessary testing or procedures. Although this is important for our patients, it is has not, nor is likely to, make any difference in healthcare costs.

All this is occurring at a time when the hospital-private practice physician partnership has largely dissolved. Hospitals want employed physicians because of the financial benefits of higher reimbursement but also because physicians as employees are much easier to control. As hospitals hire their own physicians, often in open competition with private practice physicians on their staff, the hospitals and private practice physicians are no longer partners but adversarial competitors. It is naïve to believe that hospitals will not take advantage of their position of power to eliminate the private practice competition or make changes to a system such as the complex reimbursement system which has benefited them so greatly. Even something so basic as stating the cost of a procedure has been vigorously opposed by the AHA (10). Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry has opposed transparency or government negotiation on drug prices (11). And why should the any of these healthcare administrators, pharmaceutical companies or insurance companies agree to any change? They are growing rich at the American public’s expense.

Rather than throwing up our hands in disgust or going to our windows, opening them and sticking our heads out to yell – “I'm as mad as hell and I'm not gonna take this anymore!” it is time to do something. However, as physicians we need to realize that we are weak and need help. First, we need to elect political candidates at all levels of government not based on their political affiliation but on their willingness to take action to curb healthcare costs. Second, if the politicians do not take action, we need to hold them accountable by voting for someone else. Third, we should lobby through our professional societies that administrative change needs to happen. If the societies will, we either need to serve in a society leadership role or change the leadership. Fourth, we need to oppose actions to further intrude into or control the practice of medicine at the local hospital level. For example, physician leaders are often chosen by the hospital administration not for their abilities by their amenability to a hospital administration’s agenda. As physicians we have let healthcare become controlled by greedy businessmen and correcting their intrusion into medical practice will be difficult. However, we should maintain hope, the alternative simply costs too much.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor, SWJPCC

References

1. Umar A, Robbins RA. Medical image of the month: complexity of healthcare payment. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2020;20(2):59. [CrossRef]
2. Robbins RA. National health expenditures: the past, present, future and solutions. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2015;11(4):176-85. [CrossRef]
3. Kacik A. Rising prices drive estimated 6% medical cost inflation in 2020. Modern Healthcare. June 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.modernhealthcare.com/providers/rising-prices-drive-estimated-6-medical-cost-inflation-2020 (accessed 1/30/20).
4. Morris SS, Lusby H. The physician compensation bubble is looming. American Association of Physician Leadership. January 16, 2019. Available at: https://www.physicianleaders.org/news/physician-compensation-bubble-looming (accessed 1/30/20).
5. Dickson V. CMS slashes clinic visit payments, expands 340B cuts. Modern Healthcare. November 2, 2018. Available at: https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181102/NEWS/181109978 (accessed 1/30/20).
6. Baker LC, Bundorf MK, Kessler DP. Vertical integration: hospital ownership of physician practices is associated with higher prices and spending. Health Aff (Millwood). 2014 May;33(5):756-63. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
7. Terry K. Court overturns CMS' site-neutral payment policy; doc groups upset. Medscape Medical News. September 19, 2019. Available at: https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/918744?nlid=131645_5401&src=wnl_dne_190920_mscpedit&uac=9273DT&impID=2101100&faf=1#vp_2 (accessed 1/31/20).
8. Lee TL,  Gluck AR, Curfman GD. The politics of Medicare and drug-price negotiation (updated). Health Affairs Blog. September 19, 2016. Available at: https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160919.056632/full/ (accessed 1/31/20).
9. Gaul GM. Accreditors blamed for overlooking problems. Washington Post. 2005. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/24/AR2005072401023.html (accessed 2/1/20).
10. Evans M. Hospitals turn to courts as lobbying fails to block price-transparency proposal. The Wall Street Journal. December 5, 2019. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/hospitals-turn-to-courts-as-lobbying-fails-to-block-price-transparency-proposal-11575551412 (accessed 2/1/20).
11. Parramore LS. Prescription drug costs in Americans are sky-high. And yes, Big Pharma greed is to blame. NBC News. January 2, 2020. Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/prescription-drug-costs-americans-are-sky-high-yes-big-pharma-ncna1109076 (accessed 2/1/20).

Cite as: Robbins RA. Why complexity persists in medicine. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2020;20(2):60-2. doi: https://doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc006-20 PDF 

CMS Rule Would Kick “Problematic” Doctors Out of Medicare/Medicaid

Last week CMS announced that beginning January 1, 2020, they assumed a new power to bar clinicians' participation if agency officials can cite potential harm to patients based on specific incidents (1). CMS created this new authority through the 2020 Medicare physician fee schedule. CMS claimed that it had no pathway to address "demonstrated cases of patient harm" in cases where clinicians maintain their licenses (2).

The rule drew criticism from multiple physician groups with none supporting it. The Alliance of Specialty Medicine said CMS has been using "vague and subjective" criteria to evaluate physicians for some time. The new revocation authority "just compounds the problem," the Alliance told Medscape Medical News (2).

In drafting the final version of the rule, CMS rejected many suggestions offered in comments about the revocation authority. The AMA pointed out that CMS hid such a major change in the annual physician fee schedule under the opioid treatment program section (2). The Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) said CMS should defer to state medical boards and other state oversight entities regarding issues associated with protecting beneficiaries from patient harm (2). In the final rule, CMS argued that it needs the new revocation authority due to cases where "problematic" behavior persists despite detection by state boards.

During the past week two examples of CMS’ bureaucratic nature were observed in my practice. First, I was told from a durable medical equipment provider that a new CMS requirement was that when reordering patient continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) supplies that I would need to check, initial and date each item from a long list of supplies whether it was ordered or not. Second, an asthma patient was referred to me that was using daily albuterol. I recommended a long-acting beta agonist/corticosteroid combination but was told that the patient must fail corticosteroids alone before prescribing the more expensive combination therapy. Nearly every physician and many patients have seen some nameless and faceless clerk at CMS give them the “ol’ run around”. CMS’ argument that they are improving quality and protecting patients would be more believable if these and the many other instances of bureaucratic overreach were rare rather than common. 

Many “quality” programs have been thrust on clinicians in the past without any demonstrable improvement in healthcare for patients (3). Rather quickly these programs morph from a quality program to a hammer used to control clinicians and suppress dissent. In seems likely that CMS’ new self-assumed authority will be the same. If CMS wishes to improve care, they should deal with examples such as those above and many more instances of time wasting paper work and poor care that they mandate. Two recommendations to reduce these poor decisions are: 1. List the name of the licensed practitioner responsible for each CMS decision; and 2. Establish an efficient appeals process not controlled by CMS. These would reduce the instances of poor, anonymous decision makers hiding behind the anonymity of the CMS bureaucracy and could go a long way in improving patient care.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor, SWJPCC

References

1. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. November, 2019. Available at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2019-24086.pdf (accessed 11/9/19). Scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on 11/15/2019 and available online at https://federalregister.gov/d/2019-24086.
2. Young KD. CMS sharpens weapon to kick 'problematic' docs out of Medicare. Medscape Medical News. November 7, 2019. Available at: https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/920994?nlid=132505_5461&src=wnl_dne_191108_mscpedit&uac=9273DT&impID=2159379&faf=1 (accessed 11/9/19).
3. Robbins RA. The unfulfilled promise of the quality movement. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2014;8(1):50-63. [CrossRef]

Cite as: Robbins RA. CMS rule would kick “problematic” doctors out of Medicare/Medicaid. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2019;19(5):146-7. doi: https://doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc066-19 PDF 

The Implications of Increasing Physician Hospital Employment

Several years ago, Dr. Jack had a popular, solo internal medicine practice in Phoenix. However, over a period of about 15-20 years, the profitability of Jack’s private practice dwindled and he was working 60+ hours per week to keep his head above water. This is not what he planned in his mid-50’s when he hoped to be settling into a comfortable lifestyle in anticipation of retirement. Jack eventually closed his practice and took a job as a hospital-employed physician. Jack’s story has become all too common. The majority of physicians are now hospital-employed (1).

The increase in hospital-employed physicians raises at least 2 questions: 1. How can a busy private practice not be profitable? and 2. Is it good to have most physicians hospital-employed? Like Jack, it seems most physicians seek hospital employment for financial and lifestyle reasons. But how can a primary care practice like Jack’s not be profitable when the cost of healthcare has risen so markedly?

To understand why a practice can be busy but not necessarily profitable we need to follow the money. First, reimbursement for private practice has decreased in real dollars (Figure 1) (2). 

Figure 1. Inflation and Medicare physician fee schedule (MPFS) growth in percent from 2006-2017 (2).

Private practice physician reimbursement is the only major cost center that the Centers and Medicaid Services (CMS) has singled out for asymmetrical negative annual fee schedule adjustments. The other major cost centers—hospital inpatient and outpatient, ambulatory surgical centers, and clinical laboratories—all had fee schedule adjustments that were nearly equal to and typically greater than inflation (2). Of course, private insurance companies follow CMS’ lead and so reimbursement to private practice physicians dramatically decreased (3).

In addition, increased requirements for documentation and paperwork were imposed by CMS and quickly picked up by private insurers. These required more physician time and/or the hiring of additional personnel. In addition, there were increasing annoyances and burdens placed on physicians to review and sign forms and prescriptions which already been electronically submitted. Often these annoyances were so the durable medical equipment provider, pharmacy, etc. could be reimbursed. These later burdens now take up to one-sixth of a physicians’ time, decrease office efficiency, and not surprisingly, greatly decrease physician job satisfaction (4).

The second question is whether hospital-employed physicians is a good thing for patients. Although hospitals have argued that hospital-based physicians provide better care, patient outcomes appear to be no different (5). Hospitals have engaged in a number of practices resulting in physicians being financially squeezed. The American Hospital Association (AHA) has lobbied CMS and Congress for payments that are much higher than independent physicians’ offices, assuring hospital profitability. However, under the Trump administration, CMS proposed to pay the same rate for services delivered at off-campus hospital outpatient departments and independent doctors' offices (called site neutrality) (6). This would result in about a 60% cut to the hospitals for these services (7). Not surprisingly, hospitals complained and lobbied Congress to rescind the rule (7). Later the AHA sued CMS challenging the "serious reductions to Medicare payment rates" as executive overreach (8). The case is currently pending before the courts.

Hospitals have also engaged in a number of practices to limit competition from physicians’ offices. First, several have employed a non-compete clause as a condition of obtaining staff privileges. These clauses mean that should a physician leave a hospital, the physician is unable to reestablish a practice within a specified distance of the hospital (often within a radius of 50 miles) (9). Of course, in a metropolitan area this means the physician has to leave the city, or in the case of a large hospital chain, the physician may have difficulty finding areas to practice even in the same state. Second, with the “hospitalist movement” many hospitals have seized on the opportunity to essentially self-refer. That is, the hospitals schedule follow-up appointments with primary care or other physicians employed by the hospitals.

A study documents that healthcare costs for four common procedures rose with increasing hospital physician employment (10). A 49% increase in hospital-employed physicians led to CMS paying $2.7 billion more for diagnostic cardiac catheterizations, echocardiograms, arthrocentesis and colonoscopies delivered in hospital outpatient settings than it would for treatment in independent facilities. CMS beneficiaries footed an additional $411 million.

Although many decry a fee-for-service healthcare system as being too expensive, the increase in hospital-employed physicians seems to only have increased healthcare costs. Action by CMS is needed not only for site neutrality but also a number of other areas to ensure health competition in healthcare.

Richard A. Robbins, MD

Editor, SWJPCC

References

1. Kane CK. Updated data on physician practice arrangements: For the first time, fewer physicians are owners than employees. Policy Research Perspectives. American Medical Association. 2019. Available at: https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-05/prp-fewer-owners-benchmark-survey-2018.pdf (accessed 5/11/19).
2. Cherf J. Unsustainable physician reimbursement rates. AAOS Now. October, 2017. Available at: https://www.aaos.org/AAOSNow/2017/Oct/Cover/cover01/ (accessed 5/11/19).
3. Clemens J, Gottlieb JD. In the shadow of a giant: Medicare's influence on private physician payments. J Polit Econ. 2017 Feb;125(1):1-39. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
4. Woolhandler S, Himmelstein DU. Administrative work consumes one-sixth of U.S. physicians' working hours and lowers their career satisfaction. Int J Health Serv. 2014;44(4):635-42. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
5. Short MN, Ho V. Weighing the effects of vertical integration versus market concentration on hospital quality. Med Care Res Rev. 2019 Feb 9:1077558719828938. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
6. Robbins RA. CMS decreases clinic visit payments to hospital-employed physicians and expands decreases in drug payments 340b cuts. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2018;17(5):136. [CrossRef]
7. Luthi S, Dickson V. Medicare's site-neutral pay plan targeted in hospitals' lobbying. Modern Healthcare. September 25, 2018. Available at: https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180925/TRANSFORMATION04/180929928/medicare-s-site-neutral-pay-plan-targeted-in-hospitals-lobbying (accessed May 11, 2019).
8. Luthi S. Hospitals sue over site-neutral payment policy. Modern Healthcare. December 04, 2018. Available at: https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181204/NEWS/181209973/hospitals-sue-over-site-neutral-payment-policy (accessed May 11, 2019).
9. Darves B. Restrictive covenants: A look at what’s fair, what’s legal and everything in between, Today’s Hospitalist. April 2006. Available at: https://www.todayshospitalist.com/restrictive-covenants-a-look-at-whats-fair-whats-legal-and-everything-in-between/ (accessed May 11, 2019).
10. Kacik A. Hospital-employed physicians drain Medicare. Modern Healthcare. November 14, 2017. Available at: https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20171114/NEWS/171119942/hospital-employed-physicians-drain-medicare (accessed May 11, 2019).

Cite as: Robbins RA. The implications of increasing physician hospital employment. Southwest J Pulm Crit Care. 2019;18(5):141-3. doi: https://doi.org/10.13175/swjpcc025-19 PDF